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Summary 
The European defence industry contributes to enable Member States of the 
European Union to care for the security and defence of European citizens. In 
order to safeguard the Member States’ ability to tend to their essential security 
interests, Article 346 TFEU was adopted. This Article provides Member 
States with the possibility to withhold information and take measures which 
they consider necessary to protect these interests, without having to obey EU 
law. However, Member States frequently exempted procurement of military 
equipment on the basis of Article 346 TFEU from EU public procurement 
rules. The Court of Justice of the European Union held already in 1986 in 
Case C-222/84 Johnston that the grounds of exemption from Treaty rules 
provided for in Article 346 TFEU should be interpreted narrowly. This 
problem contributed to the Commission’s proposal of a new Directive and 
later to the adoption of the Defence Procurement Directive in 2009. 
 
This thesis examines the scope of application of Article 346 TFEU in order 
to determine when a Member State is allowed to derogate from Treaty rules 
on the basis of its essential security interests. Article 346 TFEU contains a 
secrecy exemption and an armaments exemption, Article 346(1)(a) and (b) 
respectively. This thesis further examines the current legal situation of Article 
346 TFEU, including intensity of the Court’s scrutiny, proportionality, burden 
of proof and procedural requirements. Letter (a) and (b) has been seen to 
affect each other, which provides for the possibility of even more guidance 
by the Court in the pending Case C‑187/16 Commission v. Austria. 
 
The Defence Procurement Directive applies to contracts awarded in the field 
of security and defence when certain provisions such as Article 346 TFEU 
are not applicable. Nevertheless, the Defence Procurement Directive contains 
several grounds of exemption. This thesis focuses on three of these; security 
of supply, security of information and government-to-government contracts. 
Furthermore, the previously common practice of Member States to use offsets 
has been investigated. Lastly, the thesis’ analysis examines whether or not the 
European defence market will turn into a competitive market, presents 
observations of Case C‑187/16 Commission v. Austria, and analyses the scope 
of Article 346 TFEU.  
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Abbreviations 
CSDP                                                   Common Security and Defence Policy 
Defence Procurement Directive          Directive 2009/81/EC of the European 
                                                             Parliament and of the Council of 13 
                                                             July 2009 on the coordination of 
                                                             procedures for the award of certain 
                                                             works contracts, supply contracts and 
                                                             service contracts by contracting 
                                                             authorities or entities in the fields of 
                                                             defence and security, and amending 
                                                             Directives 2004/17/EC and             
                                                             2004/18/EC 
 
EDA                                                     European Defence Agency 
EDAP                                                   European Defence Action Plan 
EDF                                                      European Defence Fund 
EDIDP                                                  European Defence Industrial 
                                                              Development Programme 
 
EDRP                                                    European Development and Research 
                                                              Programme 
 
EU                                                         European Union 
EUGS                                                    EU Global Strategy on Foreign and 
                                                              Security Policy 
 
PADR                                                    Preparatory Action on Defence 
                                                               Research 
 
PESCO                                                  Permanent Structured Cooperation 
                                                               on security and defence 
 
TEU                                                       Treaty of the European Union 
TFEU                                                     Treaty of Functioning of the 
                                                               European Union 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The prime contractors of the European defence market are France and the 
United Kingdom. They have the largest defence industries and are followed 
by Germany, Italy, Sweden and increasingly Spain. The Commission reported 
that 87 % of European defence production is concentrated in these six 
countries.1 The European defence industry is a significant industrial sector, 
the turnover of 2014 was EUR 97.3 billion and it employs 500 000 people 
directly and 1.2 million indirectly. When looking at the public procurement 
of the defence industry, the market can be divided into two categories: that of 
armaments and that of security. The armaments market is mainly centred 
around ministries of defence as purchasers, whilst the security market covers 
all contracting entities. This thesis will focus on the armament section. The 
armaments market is of considerable significance, with the EU Member 
States spending EUR 194 billion on defence in 2010. The then 27 Member 
States spent 3.2 per cent of their total government expenditure on defence, 
according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.2 However, the 
defence budgets of the EU Member States have steadily decreased, at times 
drastically, since the end of the Cold War. The overall EU defence spending 
declined from €251 billion to €194 billion between 2001 and 2010. This 
severely affects the industries that develop equipment for armed forces, 
resulting in cutbacks in existing and planned programmes. Especially 
investment in defence research and development (R&D) is affected, which is 
of crucial importance for developing capabilities of the future. 
As illustrated, the industry plays a significant role in the wider European 
economy. It generates innovation, high-end engineering and technologies 
which have had indirect effects in sectors such as electronics, civil aviation 
and space. The Commission, which is responsible for upholding the EU 
treaties, implementing decisions and proposing legislation, therefore 
considers the defence sector essential in order for Europe to remain a world-
leading centre for manufacturing and innovation. Consequently, it is a part of 
the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth to 
strengthen the competitiveness of the defence sector. Moreover, the defence 
                                                 
1 Commission ‘Communication on the Results of the Consultation Launched by the Green 
Paper on Defence Procurement and on Future Commission Initiatives’ (Communication) 
COM (2005) 626 final.  
2 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 19. 
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sector provides Europe with capacity to protect its citizen, value and interests 
and to assume responsibility of its own security. For this purpose, it is 
necessary to maintain a certain degree of strategic autonomy by ensuring 
security of supply, operational sovereignty and access to critical technologies. 
In addition, defence companies in Europe have battled the shrinking defence 
budgets with an increase in exports. However, this results in transfer of 
technology, intellectual property rights and production outside of the EU 
which will affect the competitiveness of the European Defence Technological 
and Industrial Base (EDTIB) in the long run.3 
The EU has a vast set of public procurement rules, requiring publication of 
contract opportunities and prescribing certain award criteria etc. in order to 
open up the public procurement markets of the Member States to the Internal 
Market. Article 346 TFEU provides the Member States with the possibility to 
go outside of EU rules to protect their essential security interest. However, 
what was originally supposed to be a restrictively used ground for exemption, 
Article 346 TFEU ended up being frequently used by Member States, which 
brought most armament and related services outside of the EU’s trade, 
competition and procurement rules. As a result, 28 different defence markets 
emerged, consequently leading to reduced levels of innovation and 
competitiveness, higher prices, duplication and reduced transparency.4 In 
addition, protectionism and inefficiency characterised the defence markets, 
and the industry is still rated as one of the three most corrupt business sectors 
in the world in Bribe Payer’s Index of Transparency International.5 There is 
a traditional unwillingness to open defence markets to suppliers from other 
Member States, as highlighted in COM (2013) 542 final, at 41 and 53. For 
example, 80 % of defence equipment expenditure was spent on exclusively 
national procurement projects and only 13 % on purchases from other 
Member States. 
 
The Commission highlights that when spending more is difficult, spending 
better is a necessity. Assisting with this, the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) promotes and facilitates integration between Member States within the 
EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since its establishment 
in 2004. The CSDP comprises the defence and crisis management structures 
and capabilities of the EU. The EDA and the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), which is the diplomatic service and foreign and defence 
                                                 
3 Commission, ‘Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy’ (Communication) COM(2013) 
542 final.  
4 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press), p. 
24. 
5 Mark Pyman, Adressing Corruption and Building Integrity in Defence Establishments, 
(Transparency International Working Paper 02/2007)  
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ministry of the EU, together form the Secretariat of the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO). PESCO is a structural integration by 25 of the 28 
national armed forces of the EU. These are cornerstones in facilitating 
European defence. 
 
1.2 Purpose and question formulations 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the scope of the exemption ground in 
Article 346 TFEU. If the Article does not apply, defence procurements are 
required to be conducted within the framework of the Defence Procurement 
Directive (2009/81/EC). Moreover, there are several grounds for exemption 
in the Directive. This thesis will focus on the exemptions of security of 
supply, security of information and government-to-government contracts. 
Furthermore, the possibility to use offsets in defence procurement will be 
examined. Three questions will be answered in the thesis in order to fulfil this 
purpose in the ultimate way. Article 346(1)(a) TFEU allows Member States 
of the European Union to go outside of  Treaty rules by setting forth that no 
Member State is obliged to supply information that is contrary to the essential 
interests of its security. In addition, Article 346(1)(b) TFEU ensures that a 
Member State is entitled to take measures that it considers necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of its security. Therefore, the first question 
is: 
 
i. What is the scope of a Member State’s essential security interest 
regarding security of supply, security of information, government 
to government procurements and offsets, and is that scope defined 
identically in Article 346(1)(a) and 346(1)(b) TFEU? 
 
The second question aims to further define the scope of Article 346 TFEU by 
investigating which kind of measures and information that have been allowed 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Commission etc., and 
which measures that have been considered to fall outside the scope of 
application of the Article. Therefore, the second question is: 
 
ii. What is the scope of the terms “information” and “measures” 
used in Article 346 TFEU concerning security of supply, security 
of information, government-to-government contracts and offsets? 
 
By answering these questions, the scope of Article 346 TFEU in relation to 
the Defence Procurement Directive will be thoroughly investigated. 
Furthermore, the Commission have stated in its report on the implementation 
of the Defence Procurement Directive that it is continuously satisfied with the 
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text of the Directive and does not aspire to further change it.6 However, there 
is consensus between the Commission and doctrine regarding the 
implementation of the Defence Procurement Directive. Interestingly, even 
though the uptake of the Directive has shown a steady upward trend since it 
entered into force in 2011, neither is pleased with the present effect of the 
Directive.7 Consequently, the third question is: 
 
i. Why has the Defence Procurement Directive not had the desired 
effect, and what measures are the Commission taking to adjust 
this? 
 
1.3 Method and material 
The method that has been used is the European legal method. The European 
legal method refers to the approach used to deal with EU legal sources.8 EU 
law sources are used in this paper due to the fact that the addressed issues are 
regulated at EU level, and that the current legal situation will be investigated 
on an EU level. Moreover, EU legal practice from the European Court of 
Justice (and the Tribunal) has been applied in this paper. Furthermore, EU 
case law is binding and directly applicable in all Member States and 
contributes inter alia to clarify how the provisions of the Treaty and the 
Defence Procurement Directive should be interpreted. 9 In addition to EU 
legislation (ie, Directives and Treaties) and case law, Communications and 
Guidance Notes from the Commission will also be used in this paper. Such 
instruments are not legally binding but should be taken into consideration 
since they have a significant normative effect in practice. 10 Even though EU 
law is said to lack the equivalence of Swedish preparatory works, some of the 
reports that resulted in the adaption of the Directive have been used to get a 
picture of the background to the adoption of the Defence Procurement 
Directive.11 
 
Furthermore, doctrine has been used as it is a widely accepted source of law. 
Although doctrine is the lowest legal source, it can still contribute to legal 
developments through the internal logic of the arguments put forward by the 
                                                 
6 Commission, ‘Report on the implementation of Directive 2009/81/EC on public 
rocurement in the fields of defence and security, to comply with Article 73(2) of that 
Directive’ (Report) COM(2016) 762 final. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Jane Reichel,”EU-rättslig metod”, (Studentlitteratur, Lund 2013), p. 109. 
9 Jane Reichel,”EU-rättslig metod”, (Studentlitteratur, Lund 2013), p. 115. 
10 Jane Reichel,”EU-rättslig metod”, (Studentlitteratur, Lund 2013), p. 128. 
11 Fredric Korling and Mauro Zamboni 2013, ”Juridisk metodlära”, (Lund Studentlitteratur 
AB, 2013) 
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author (or authors).12 EU legal doctrine has been used, as well as articles. The 
most comprehensive and relevant doctrine in the field of defence procurement 
in the EU is Professor Martin Trybus's work, "Buying Defence and Security 
in Europe", which has been studied. Regarding sources, the OSCOLA system 
for citation of legal authorities has been used.  
 
1.4 Delimitations 
First, this thesis will be limited to legislation on an EU level and will focus 
on the scope of Article 346 TFEU. The scope of this Article is general in the 
sense that the Member States themselves are allowed to define what 
constitutes their essential security interests, however all exemptions from 
Treaty rules are to be interpreted narrowly as established by the Court. The 
field of national security and defence procurement is wide, which is why this 
thesis will not go further into the area of Intra-Community transfers, exports 
and standardisations, where there are defence specific regulations. Neither 
will this thesis explore the European armaments law and policy that applies 
outside of the Internal Market, or NATO, EDA and OCCAR. 
 
OCCAR is an international organisation which focuses on the through life 
management of cooperative defence equipment programmes, and NATO is 
an intergovernmental military alliance between some North American 
countries and several European countries. These organisations affect the 
defence market on an international level as well as on a European level, but 
due to the legal nature of this thesis, priority has been given to legal provisions 
either in the Defence Procurement Directive or in the Treaty. 
 
Moreover, the Defence Procurement Directive contains several provisions 
and exemptions, but this thesis will focus on security of supply, security of 
information and government-to-government specifically. National law will 
not be included in this thesis, nor will review and remedies in the Defence 
Procurement Directive be further developed. In addition, the armaments 
market will be in focus, in favour of the security market. Export control will 
not be further addressed either. 
 
1.5 Current state of research 
There is plenty of research material such as doctrine regarding Article 346 
TFEU, the exemptions of security of supply, security of information, 
                                                 
12 Jan Kleineman, ”Rättsdogmatisk metod” (Lund Studentlitteratur 2013). 
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government-to-government procurements and offsets. Yet, although there is 
case law regarding Article 346 TFEU from the Court, the amount is limited 
which is often mentioned in doctrine. Moreover, the Commission have 
released several Guidance Notes relating to Article 346 TFEU and the 
aforementioned exemptions from the Defence Procurement Directive. 
Furthermore, an implementation report on the Directive has been released by 
the Commission, and several Communications, Working Papers, Green 
Papers, press releases etc. regarding the defence sector. 
 
Concerning future related issues like the Commission initiated European 
Defence Fund (EDF) on the other hand, which is meant to work as an 
incentive to cross border cooperation in the defence industry in order to 
increase competition and decrease fragmentation, there is not much legal 
research to be found. This can be explained by the fact that the EDF consists 
of a Communication and a proposal for a European Defence Industrial 
Development Programme (EDIDP) Regulation. If the European Parliament 
and the Council decide to adopt the Regulation in early 2018, the 
Development Programme will be operational in early 2019. 
 
1.6 Outline 
In Chapter 2, the legal framework concerning Article 346 TFEU will be laid 
out. Relevant case law will be presented to further carve out the scope of these 
provisions, as well as Communications and Guidance Notes from the 
Commission. The scope of application of Article 346 TFEU will be 
investigated in order to determine when a Member State is allowed to 
derogate from Treaty rules on the basis of its essential security interests. 
Article 346 TFEU contains a secrecy exemption and an armaments 
exemption, Article 346(1)(a) and (b) TFEU respectively. Furthermore, 
Article 346(2) TFEU refers to a list of the products to which the provisions 
of paragraph 1(b) apply. Firstly, the relevance of this list will be investigated. 
Secondly, relevant case law is examined to further define the current legal 
situation of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU. This includes intensity of the Court’s 
scrutiny, proportionality, burden of proof and procedural requirements. 
Thirdly, Article 346(1)(a) TFEU will be looked into as well as the pending 
Case C‑187/16 Commission v. Austria.  
 
In Chapter 3, the exemptions in the Defence Procurement Directive (security 
of supply, security of information and government-to-government), and the 
possibility to use offsets will be investigated. The Defence Procurement 
Directive applies to contracts awarded in the field of security and defence 
when certain provisions such as Article 346 TFEU are not applicable. 
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Nevertheless, the Defence Procurement Directive contains several grounds of 
exemption. This thesis focuses on three of these; security of supply, security 
of information and government-to-government contracts. Furthermore, the 
previously common practice of Member States to use offsets will be 
investigated.  
 
In Chapter 4, an analysis will be conducted. The scope of Article 346 TFEU 
and the potential impact of the pending case Commission v. Austria will be 
analysed. Finally, it will be discussed whether or not the European defence 
market will turn into a competitive market.  
 
 11 
2 The legal base of the Defence 
Procurement Directive – 
Article 346 TFEU 
The Defence Procurement Directive, just like all directives, is a piece of 
secondary EU law. The purpose of this is to provide a more detailed 
interpretation of primary law, such as Article 346 TFEU, and further expand 
and provide depth to it. Secondary legislation is initiated by the Commission 
after consultations with stakeholders, and then passed by the Council which 
represents the Member States, and the European Parliament, where the 
members are directly elected. Their limits are set by the TFEU. The primary 
legislation regulating the European Union was unanimously formed by the 
Member State governments, and ratified by the parliaments of each Member 
State or by referenda. It constitutes the foundation of the Defence 
Procurement Directive, and defines its limitations. The Directive touches 
upon several dimensions of the TFEU, including competition (anti-trust) such 
as merger control, State aid and exports outside of the Union (export control) 
and intra-Community trade with armaments as well as other security sensitive 
goods.  
 
In Article 3 TFEU, it is stated that the EU has exclusive competence to 
“establish competition rules necessary for the functioning of the Internal 
Market”. Furthermore, Article 4 TFEU stipulates that there is a shared 
competence between the EU and Member States in the principle area of the 
Internal Market. Exclusive competence means Member States are no longer 
able to legislate in a specified area. When Member States have a shared 
competence, they are allowed to legislate in an area as long as the EU does 
not legislate in that field. Consequently, following the Defence Procurement 
Directive, the Member States action in this area is pre-empted. In addition, 
Article 4(3) TFEU embodies the principle of solidarity, which entails the 
obligations of Member States to “assist each other in carrying out tasks which 
flow from the Treaties” in full mutual respect. Moreover, the Preamble of the 
Directive refers to present Articles 62 (on services), 53(1) (on establishment) 
and 114 (the general Internal Market legal base) TFEU as legal basis for the 
Directive, which together with Articles 18 TFEU prohibit protectionist 
behaviour by Member States against each other.    
 
Articles 28-37 TFEU establish the free movement of goods, which was 
widely defined in Arts Treasures as “products which can be valued in money 
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and which are capable of forming the subject of commercial transactions”.13 
This clearly includes armaments and the products on the Council’s list of 15 
April 1958, which will be discussed below. The prohibitions in Articles 34 
and 35 TFEU, which concern quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, 
and all measures having equivalent effect, are not absolute. Restrictions 
violating these Articles can be justified by grounds of exemption in Article 
36 TFEU, the most relevant basis in this case being the one of public security. 
However, such justifications cannot “constitute a means of arbitrarily 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States”. 
Furthermore, Articles 45(3), 52(1) and 65(1) TFEU holds that public security 
can be used to justify a derogation. Moreover, the concept of public security 
is defined widely and covers all aspects of security, internal and external, 
including national security.14 In contrast, the exemption in Article 346 TFEU 
relate to a narrower concept of security, which is pointed out by Advocate 
General Sir Gordon Slynn in Campus Oil.15  
 
2.1 Grounds for exemption in Article 346 
TFEU  
The purpose of Article 346 TFEU is to give the Member States the possibility 
to care for the essential interests of their security, and balance that with the 
maintenance and promotion of the Internal Market. The Article reads as 
follows:  
 
“1. The provisions of the Treaties shall not preclude the application of the 
following rules: 
(a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of 
which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security; 
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for 
the protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected 
with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such 
measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the 
                                                 
13 Case 7/68, Commission v. Italy [1968] ECLI:EU:C:1968:51.  
14 Case C-367/89, Criminal Proceedings against Aimé Richardt and Les Accessories 
Scientifiques SNC [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:376, para. 22; Case C-70/94 Fritz Werner 
Industrie-Ausrustungen GmbH v. Germany [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:328, para. 25; Case C-
83/94, Criminal Proceedings against Peter Leifer and others [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:329, 
para. 26.   
15 Case 72/83, Campus Oil Limited v. Minister for Industry and Energy [1984] 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:256, at 2764. 
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internal market regarding products which are not intended for specifically 
military purposes. 
 
2. The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, 
make changes to the list, which it drew up on 15 April 1958, of the products 
to which the provisions of paragraph 1(b) apply.” 
 
Ultimately, this Article represents the borderline between the Internal Market 
and the Member States competence regarding national security.  It determines 
the substance of the Defence Procurement Directive, and sets the limits of the 
scope of application of it.   
 
2.2 Narrow interpretation 
In Case 222/84 Johnston, the Court expressed that Article 346 TFEU is one 
of the limited amount of articles which the Treaty provides for grounds of 
derogations applicable in situations that may involve public safety, and that 
these articles “deal with exceptional and clearly defined cases. Because of 
their limited character, those articles do not lend themselves to a wide 
interpretation”. This paragraph has been continuously repeated by the Court, 
in Case C-187/01 Dory in 2001 and in the eight Military Exports Cases16 in 
2009-2010, and suggests a narrow interpretation of Article 346 TFEU. 
Furthermore, the Court have clarified in C-294/05 Commission v. Sweden that 
“although it is for the Member States to take appropriate measures to ensure 
their internal and external security, it does not follow that such measures are 
entirely outside the scope of Community law”.17 Moreover, the Court held in 
the same case that the derogations provided for in Article 346 TFEU must, in 
respect of derogations from fundamental freedoms, be interpreted strictly18, 
confirming the narrow interpretation of the Article. Furthermore, the measure 
must be necessary to counter a real, specific and serious risk to the security 
interest concerned.19 
 
                                                 
16 Case C-284/05, Commission v. Finland [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:778, Case C-294/05, 
Commission v. Sweden [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:779, Case C-372/05, Commission v. 
Germany [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:780, Case C-38/06, Commission v. Portugal [2010] 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:108, Case C-461/05 Commission v. Denmark [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:783, Case C-239/06, Commission v. Italy [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:784, 
Case C-409/05 Commission v. Greece [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:782.   
17 Case C-294/05, Commission v. Sweden [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:779, para. 43.  
18 Ibid, para. 44.  
19 Case C-423/98, Albore [2000] E.C.R. I-5965, at [22]; 
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On the other hand, there are cases which seem to have deviated from this 
position. In Case T-26/01 Fiocchi Munizioni v. Commission, the Tribunal 
stated that the regime established by Article 346 TFEU is intended to 
“preserve the freedom of action of the Member States in certain matters 
affecting national defence and security”, and concluded that since the Article 
is among the Treaty’s “general and final provisions…it has, for the activities 
which it covers and on the conditions which it sets forth, a general effect, 
capable of affecting all the ordinary legal provisions of the Treaty, including 
those on the competition rules”. Moreover, the Tribunal puts forward that 
Article 346(1)(b) TFEU “confers on the Member States a particularly wide 
discretion” regarding the assessment of measures they consider necessary for 
the protection of the essential interests of their security.20 However, this is to 
be understood as giving the Member States a wide range in areas of 
applicability regarding article 346(1)(b) TFEU, not as standing in conflict 
with the narrow interpretation of the Article (see Chapter 2.2.1.3).   
 
In the pending Case C‑187/16 Commission v. Austria, Advocate General 
Kokott acknowledges this paragraph in her Opinion. She precedes by 
reminding the Court of its reasoning in Case C-157/06 Commission v. Italy, 
where the Court stated that the provisions in Article 346 TFEU do not make 
it possible for Member States to derogate from their duties under EU law 
based on no more than reliance on their essential national security interests.21 
Furthermore, in Military Export the Court ruled that the secrecy exemption in 
Article 346(1)(a) TFEU only can be invoked on a case-by-case basis.22 In 
German Export, the Court ruled on this to apply to the exemption as a 
whole.23 According to Trybus, professor in EU Law at Birmingham 
University and an expert in the field of EU defence procurement, this 
indicates that national codes derogating from Treaty rules on the basis of 
Article 346(1)(b) TFEU, such as in Commission v. Italy24, would be deemed 
illegal.25  
 
2.2.1 The armaments exemption of Article 
346(1)(b) TFEU 
The armaments exemption in Article 346(1)(b) TFEU allows a Member State  
                                                 
20 Case T-26/01, Fiocchi Munizioni v. Commission [2003] ECLI:EU:T:2003:248, para. 58.  
21 C-157/06, Commission v. Italy [2008], ECLI:EU:C:2008:530, para. 75.  
22 Case C-294/05, Commission v. Sweden [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:779, para. 51.  
23 Case C-372/05, Commission v. Germany [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:780, para. 76 
24 Case C-157/06, Commission v. Italy [2008], ECLI:EU:C:2008:530 
25 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 121. 
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“to take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the 
essential interests of its security which are connected with the production or 
trade in arms, munitions and war material”.  
 
The following section will further interpret this part of Article 346 TFEU.  
 
2.2.1.1 The 1958 list of armaments in Article 346(2) 
TFEU 
Article 223(2) EEC (which is now Article 346(2)), obliged the Council to 
produce a list of what constitute such “arms, munitions and war material”. 
According to Trybus, the list is to be understood as an integral part of Article 
346(1)(b) TFEU although the legal status is unclear. Since the list is a separate 
part of the TFEU, amendments are subject to a unanimous decision of the 
Council. The list was produced in 1958, and there has been no amendments 
since then. For a long time, the list was unpublished and the level of secrecy 
differed between Member States. Some kept it strictly confidential, and the 
Commission and others provided copies of it to anybody interested. The list 
was finally published in academic publications in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Consequently, it was easier for Member States to abuse Article 346 TFEU by 
extending the Article to concern products which were not on the list, due to 
the difficulty of holding them accountable for violations when the extent of 
the provision was unknown.  
 
The list is still not officially published, however the Council published an 
“Extract of Council Decision 255/58 of 15 April 1958” in 2008.26 Recital 10 
in the Commission’s Guidance Note on the Defence Procurement Directive 
sets out that this is the relevant version. Furthermore, recital 10 in the Defence 
Procurement Directive confirms that the list is “generic and to be interpreted 
in a broad way in the light of the evolving character of technology, 
procurement policies and military requirements which lead to the 
development of new types of equipment” which was also the position of the 
Commission in its Guidance Note from 2006 on Article 296 EC (present day 
Article 346 TFEU).27 Nevertheless, the list is still to be interpreted narrowly 
because it provides an exemption to Treaty rules, and an extensive 
interpretation would risk to undermine the functioning of the Internal Market 
as stated by the Court in Johnston.28  
                                                 
26 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 88-93.  
27 Commission, ‘Guidance Note on Article 296 EC’ (Guidance Note), 2006, p. 5.  
28 Case 222/84, Johnston [1986] ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, para. 26.  
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Moreover, Trybus argues that the list is exhaustive and constitutes a limitation 
of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU due to the wording of Article 346(2) TFEU which 
“clearly limits the application of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU to good on the 
list”.29 This is confirmed in the judgement T-26/01-Fiocchi Munizioni v. 
Commission, were the Tribunal concludes that it is clear from the wording of 
the Article that Article 346(1)(b) TFEU is “not intended to apply to activities 
relating to products other than the military products identified on the 
Council’s list of 15 April 1958”.30    
 
2.2.1.2 Armaments intended for specifically military 
purposes: Agusta and Finnish Turntables 
Materials that can be used for both military and civil purposes usually falls 
outside the scope of the list, because of its limitations. These goods are often 
referred to as “dual use goods” or “soft defence material”, and can for 
example be transport aircraft, cross-country vehicles and tents. The Court 
have dealt with the point of intersection in several cases, and thereby 
crystallizing the scope of the Article. In addition, it should be pointed out that 
products considered to have a military purpose which are not represented on 
the 1958 list, are not covered by Article 346(1)(b) TFEU and consequently 
will have to be exempted by the public security exemption in Article 36 
TFEU. In the Italian cases Agusta31 and Commission v. Italy32, the Court 
addressed the question whether it is sufficient for an item to be on the 1958 
list, or if additional requirements has to be met in order to rely on the 
derogation ground in Article 346 TFEU.  
 
In Agusta, the Italian Republic excluded supplies of light helicopters for the 
use of police forces and the national fire service from Treaty based 
procurement rules by relying on Article 296(1)(b) EC (present day Article 
346 TFEU), since the helicopters were dual-use items. The Commission 
argued that Italy did so unrightfully, since the helicopters were to be used 
essentially civilian and therefore not normally in military operations, and 
brought actions under what is now Article 258 TFEU against Italy. The fact 
that the helicopters had to have certain characteristics similar to those of 
military helicopters was not sufficient for them to be equated with military 
supplies, and consequently the Commission deemed them to be intended for 
a possible dual use. The Court initially reminded the parties of its previous 
                                                 
29 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 94.  
30 Case T-26/01, Fiocchi Munizioni v. Commission [2003] ECLI:EU:T:2003:248, para. 60.  
31 Case C-337/05, Commission v. Italy [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:203 
32 Case C-157/06, Commission v. Italy [2008], ECLI:EU:C:2008:530 
 17 
case law, according to which provisions that enable derogations from the 
Treaty in connection with public procurement shall be interpreted strictly. 
Moreover, the burden to prove such exceptional circumstances that can justify 
an exemption relies with the party seeking to apply the derogation.33 In 
addition, although Member States are allowed to take measures in order to 
protect their essential security interest according to Article 296(1)(b) EC, 
these measures must not alter the conditions of competition in the Internal 
Market regarding products which are not intended for specifically military 
purposes.34  
 
The Court stated that it is clear from the wording of Article 296(1)(b) EC that 
in order for products to be exempted from Treaty rules on the grounds of the 
Article, they have to be intended for specifically military purposes. 
Accordingly, if the military purpose is hardly certain, the purchase in question 
needs to correspond with the rules governing the award of public contracts. 
The Court concluded that items that are clearly for civilian use, which only 
has a potential military use, cannot be exempted on the base of Article 
296(1)(b) EC.35 The Court mirrored this judgement in the case Commission 
v. Italy a couple of months later, where the Commission sought a clarification 
from the Court that Italy had failed its obligations under EU law by adopting 
a national code 36   
 
The Court follow a clearly logical way in its reasoning. Many products are of 
dual use, and many of the European companies which produce armaments 
also manufactures civil products. Therefore, Trybus argues, taking measures 
to put armaments outside of Internal Market law can easily affect civil 
goods.37 In the following case C-615/10 Finnish Turntables, the Court again 
touched upon the issue of what constitutes a specifically military purpose, and 
further narrows the scope. The Finnish Defence Forces Technical Research 
Centre had not procured turntables on the basis of the Public Sector Directive, 
due assuming they were exempted from the Directive on the basis of Article 
10 of that Directive and from the Treaty on the ground of the armaments 
exception in Article 346(1)(b) TFEU.  
 
The Court set out that even if a product is on the Council list of 15 April 1958, 
and the product has technical applications for civilian use which are largely 
identical, it can only be considered to be intended for specifically military 
                                                 
33 Case C-337/05, Commission v. Italy [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:203, para. 43 and 44. 
34 Ibid, para. 46.  
35 Ibid, para. 47-49.  
36 Case C-157/06, Commission v. Italy [2008], ECLI:EU:C:2008:530, para. 23-28. 
37 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 98.  
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purposes within the terms of Article 346 TFEU “if such use is not solely that 
which the contracting authority intends to confer on it, but also (…) that 
which results from the intrinsic characteristics of a piece of equipment 
specially designed, developed or modified significantly for those purposes.”38 
The Court then established that the use of the word “military”, and the words 
“insofar as they are of a military nature” and “exclusively designed” used 
respectively in points 11, 14 and 15 of the list, indicate that the turntables 
must have a specifically military nature in objective terms.39 In addition, the 
Court noted that recital 10 in the preamble of the Defence Procurement 
Directive  mentions the words “military equipment” and explained them to be 
understood as to cover products that later have been adapted to military 
purposes to be used as arms, munition or war material, even though they were 
first designed for civilian use. The Court finally concluded that the turntables 
are covered by point 15 read together with points 11 and 14 of the list.  
 
Interestingly, in this case the Court takes on a relatively comprehensive 
analysis of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU compared to its previous rulings on the 
Article. The first part of the analysis investigates whether or not the product 
in question (the turntables) is on the 1958 list of armaments or not, and the 
second part examines if the national security interests of the Member State 
justify derogation. The judgement builds on the Agusta case and the hardly 
certain criterion, by clarifying that additional requirements need to be met if 
a product is clearly intended for military purposes but also has possibilities 
for essentially identical civilian purposes, in order for Article 346(1)(b) TFEU 
to be applicable. The Court further develops its reasoning by setting forth that 
the material in question has to be specifically designed, developed or through 
“substantial modifications” intended for military purposes “by virtue of its 
intrinsic characteristics”. According to Trybus, this is a high threshold since 
dual-use items on the 1958 list need to be specifically designed, developed 
and modified for military purposes.40  
 
However, in paragraph 46 of its judgement the Court concludes that dual-use 
items on the list can be exempted on the basis of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU if 
they have been “specially designed and developed, also as a result of 
substantial modifications” for specifically military purposes, by virtue to their 
intrinsic characteristics. In paragraph 40 of the same judgement, the Court 
clarifies this by referring to “intrinsic characteristics of a piece of equipment 
                                                 
38 Case C-615/10 Finnish Turntables [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:324, para. 40.  
39 Ibid, para. 41. 
40 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 102; Commission ‘Interpretative communication on the application of Article 296 
of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement’ (Communication) COM(2006) 779 final 
[2006] sets out the same interpretation.  
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specifically designed, developed or modified significantly for those 
purposes”. Consequently, this must be understood as the terms not being 
cumulative. Trybus further states that the Finnish Turntable judgement 
clarifies what was missing in the Agusta case by making the 1958 list a part 
of its analysis, whereas in Agusta the Court does not mention the list.41  
 
To conclude the current legal situation regarding dual-use items, it is possible 
to exempt them from Treaty rules on the basis of Article 346 TFEU if certain 
conditions are met. The Advocate General in Case C-337/05 Commission v. 
Italy, on the contrary, interpreted the words “for specifically military 
purpose” to in itself preclude dual-use products.42 However, this was not 
brought up by the Court and in the light of Agusta and recently Finnish 
Turntables, the Court has made no indications to completely shut the door for 
dual-use products on the 1958 list.   
 
2.2.1.3 General provision and wide discretion: Fiocchi 
Munizioni 
As previously stated, all exemptions from Treaty rules must be interpreted 
narrowly according to the by the Court repeatedly referred to Johnston 
judgement.43 In Fiocchi Munizioni, an Italian manufacturer of arms and 
munitions made a formal complaint to the Commission due to Spain having 
granted subsidies to a Spanish undertaking owned by the state which 
produced arms, munitions and tanks as well.44 The Commission consequently 
initiated bilateral communications with Spain on the basis of Article 348 
subparagraph 1 TFEU. Spain argued that the activities of the undertaking 
concerned were lawful on the basis of 346(1)(b) TFEU and recognized in 
Spanish law to be in the interest of the national defence of Spain. Moreover, 
Spain argued that the company’s production was principally intended for the 
Spanish armed forces which was also covered by the Spanish law on State 
secrets. The Italian manufacturer, on the other hand, considered the actions 
of Spain to distort competition. The Commission did not act, whereby the 
Italian manufacturer brought an action for failure to act against the 
Commission on the basis of 265 subparagraph 3 TFEU.   
 
                                                 
41 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 102.  
42 Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-337/05 Commission v. Italy [2008] 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:421, para. 59.  
43 Case 222/84, Johnston [1986] ECLI:EU:C:1986:206 para. 26, Case C-414/97 
Commission v. Spain [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:417, para. 21.  
44 Case T-26/01, Fiocchi Munizioni v. Commission [2003] ECLI:EU:T:2003:248 
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In this case, the Tribunal stated that the position of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU 
among the Treaty’s “general and final provisions” confirms a general effect 
for the activities which it covers and on the conditions which it sets forth, that 
can affect all ordinary legal provisions in the Treaty. Furthermore, the 
Tribunal set out that the Article confers a “particularly wide discretion” on 
the Member States when assessing the need protect its essential security 
interests.45 By its wording, it seems to widen the by the Court previously 
established narrow scope of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU. Consequently, it was 
used by the Italian government in Commission v. Italy in order to try to justify 
derogation from Treaty rules on the basis of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU.46 
However, the Court has never confirmed this part of the judgement of the 
Tribunal in its following case law, it has on the contrary continued to repeat 
its narrow interpretation from Johnston. Most recently in Finnish turntables, 
and it is furthermore used by the Advocate General Kokott in the pending 
case Commission v. Austria.  
 
However, as interpreted by Trybus, the general effect of the provisions and 
the wide discretion of Member States must be separated from the necessity of 
the measures in question and the judicial scrutiny applied to it by the Tribunal. 
Accordingly, the judgement is not as controversial as it first can be perceived. 
The Tribunal did not express a certain rule regarding military export of hard 
defence material, but it has been argued in doctrine, based on the narrow 
interpretation of Treaty exemptions, that such equipment would not be 
included within the meaning of a Member State’s essential security interests 
as opposed to hard defence material intended to satisfy domestic needs.47   
 
2.2.1.4 Measures (not) necessary for national security: 
Spanish Weapons 
The armaments exception in Article 346(1)(b) TFEU was narrowly defined 
in itself in the judgement of 1999 Spanish Weapons, when the Court for the 
first time applied the Johnston doctrine to this specific part of the Article. The 
case concerned a Spanish law that exempted exports and intra EU-transfers 
of hard defence material from value-added tax (VAT), while an EU Directive 
included all exports, imports and intra EU-transfers in the scope of VAT. 
Spain argued that the state complied with EU law on the basis of what is now 
Article 346(1)(b) TFEU, and that the exemption from VAT tax was necessary 
for the effectiveness of its armed forces and to guarantee the achievement of 
the essential objectives of its overall strategic plan. However, it seemed like 
                                                 
45 Case T-26/01, Fiocchi Munizioni v. Commission [2003] ECLI:EU:T:2003:248, p. 58.  
46 C-337/05 Commission v. Italy [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:203, para. 51. 
47 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 103-104.  
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Spain intended to give its defence industries a competitive advantage by 
exempting their products from VAT and thus reducing their costs. 
Furthermore, this affected the revenue of the Union. The Court ruled that 
Spain had “not demonstrated that the exemptions provided for in the Law are 
necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security…It follows 
that the VAT exemptions are not necessary in order to achieve the objective 
of protecting the essential interests of the security of…Spain”. This case 
confirms that the Court has the power to review the decision of a Member 
State to invoke Article 346(1)(b) TFEU, and the grounds of justification.  
 
The Military Exports cases provided a similar background. Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Germany exempted imports of 
military products from custom duties. The countries had not calculated or 
payed the resources of the EU component of the customs duties due to this 
exemption which they based on Article 346(1)(b) TFEU. The Court repeated 
paragraph 22 of Spanish Weapons and stated again that the burden of proof 
that a situation is justified by Article 346(1)(b) TFEU relies on the Member 
State trying to invoke the Article. Moreover, the Court rules that the Member 
States had “not shown that the conditions necessary for the application of 
Article 346 TFEU are satisfied”, thus confirming the judgement in Spanish 
Weapons.    
 
2.2.1.4.1 Proportionality and intensity of scrutiny 
The usage of the word “necessary” by the Court implies that there is a 
proportionality test involved concerning Article 346(1)(b) TFEU. The very 
use of this word in certain Treaty provisions resulted in the establishment of 
the principle in EU law.48 According to de Búrca, the proportionality test 
offers “a spectrum ranging from a very deferential approach, to quite a 
rigorious and searching examination of the justification for a measure”.49 In 
Spanish Weapons, the Court refers to the Johnston judgement where there is 
no differentiation between the types of security exemptions in the Treaty. 
However, only the public security exemptions were discussed.50 The Court 
repeated this in Sirdar and Kreil, where it applied a proportionality test in 
relation to public security, without separating the security type exemptions in 
the Treaty.51 In the Military Exports cases, the Court refers to Sirdar, Kreil 
                                                 
48 Paul Craig and Grainne de Búrca, EU law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford 
University Press 2003), p. 371-2.  
49 Grainne de Búrca, ”The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law” 
(Yearbook of European Law 1993), p. 111.  
50 Case 222/84, Johnston [1986] ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, para. 26.  
51 Case C-273/97, Sirdar [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:523, para. 26; Case C-285/98, Kreil 
[2000] ECLI:EU:C:1999:525, para. 25; Case C-186/01, Dory [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:146. 
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and Dory regarding articles concerning public safety and mentions Article 
346 TFEU among others, again without differentiating between the 
exemptions.52  
 
Trybus argues that this, in the light of Spanish Weapons, more specifically 
leads to Article 346 TFEU. Moreover, it is suggested that the principle of 
proportionality has to be applied when the Court has jurisdiction, since 
proportionality is a crucial aspect of the rule of law and the EU and all 
Member states are founded on the rule of law, as can be seen in the Preamble 
of the TEU (Lisbon) and its Article 2. In addition, the principle is a 
requirement in and has to be met by EU legislation and case law.53 
Furthermore, the wording of Article 346 TFEU allows Member States to take 
measures “as it considers necessary for the essential interests of its security”. 
Again, in the Military Exports cases, the Court stated that the mere costs of 
military equipment cannot make it necessary to exempt them from customs 
duties.54 The Court also express necessity as a standard of review by stating 
that Member States cannot make derogations from Treaty rules on the basis 
of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU on “no more than reliance” on its essential 
security interests.55 If they could have done so however, the “necessity” 
would be determined by the Member States alone, and thereby leaving no 
room for proportionality or any other tests to be applied by the Court.  
 
Regarding intensity of scrutiny, since the exemption from VAT in Spanish 
Weapons and from export duties in Military Exports were clearly 
unnecessary, the judgements do not serve as an example for a strict scrutiny 
by the Court. As previously shown in the Tribunal’s judgement Fiocchi 
Munizioni, the scrutiny leaves a wide margin of political discretion to the 
Member States.56 According to experts in the field, there is generally a higher 
                                                 
52 C-294/05, Commission v. Sweden [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:779, para. 43. 
53 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 113.  
54 Case C-284/05, Commission v. Finland [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:778, para. 55; Case C-
294/05, Commission v. Sweden [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:779, para. 53; Case C-372/05, 
Commission v. Germany [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:780 para. 78, Case C-38/06, Commission 
v. Portugal [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:108, para 72; Case C-461/05 Commission v. Denmark 
[2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:783, para. 61; Case C-239/06, Commission v. Italy [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:784, para. 55; Case C-409/05 Commission v. Greece [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:782, para. 60.   
55 Commission v. Finland, para. 83, Commission v. Sweden, para. 45, Commission v. 
Germany, para. 70, Commission v. Portugal, para. 64, Commission v. Denmark, para. 53, 
Commission v. Italy, para. 47, Commission v. Greece, para. 52.  
56 Case T-26/01, Fiocchi Munizioni v. Commission [2003] ECLI:EU:T:2003:248, para. 58.  
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degree of judicial deference or self-restraint in certain specific policy 
contexts, including national security.57  
 
2.2.1.5 Burden of proof 
The Court has repeatedly, over time, held that the responsibility to justify a 
derogation from the Treaty on the ground of Article 346 TFEU relies within 
the Member States. In Case C-414/97 Spanish Weapons58 from 1997, the 
Court states that “it is for the Member State which seeks to rely on those 
exceptions to furnish evidence that the exemptions in question do not go 
beyond the limits” of cases regarding Article 346 TFEU. Furthermore, the 
Court made clear in C-294/05, Commission v. Sweden from 2008 that 
although Article 346 TFEU “refers to measures which a Member State may 
consider necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security 
or of information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to those 
interests, that Article cannot however be read in such a way as to confer on 
Member States a power to depart from the provisions of the Treaty based on 
no more than reliance on those interests.”59 In the same case, the Court 
concludes that it is for the Member State which seeks to take advantage of the 
Article to prove that it is “necessary to have recourse to that derogation in 
order to protect its essential security interest”.60 The latter statement was 
repeated in C-615/10 Finland v. Commission in 2009.61 
 
Trybus criticises the Court and argues that it might have gone too far on this 
point. The Member States have been given the possibility to derogate from 
the rules of the Treaty on the basis of their essential security interests in the 
Treaty, which gives them a necessary flexibility to fulfil their responsibility 
concerning defence. However, putting the burden of proof solely on the 
Member States compromises this flexibility to an extent that can be seen as 
contrary to the reason of this flexibility. Therefore, a possible alternative 
solution would be to have an evidentiary presumption in favour of the 
respective government, including the benefit of any reasonable doubt.62  
 
                                                 
57 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 112. 
58 Case C-414/97 Commission v. Spain [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:417, para. 22.  
59 C-294/05, Commission v. Sweden [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:779, para. 45.  
60 C-294/05, Commission v. Sweden [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:779, para. 47. 
61 C-615/10 Finnish Turntables [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:324, para. 45. 
62 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 120.  
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2.2.1.6 Procedural requirements and review procedure 
In Case Fiocchi Munizioni mentioned above, the Court brings up the 
procedural aspect of Article 346 TFEU. It states that two specific legal 
remedies are set out in the Treaty concerning measures adopted by the 
Member States on the basis of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU. Firstly, subparagraph 
1 of Article 348 states that if a measure taken in circumstances referred to in 
Article 346 TFEU has the effect of distorting the conditions of competition 
of the Internal Market, the Commission shall examine how those measures 
can be adjusted to Treaty rules together with the Member State concerned 
according to Article 348(1) TFEU. The Court sets out that if a State aid 
measure adopted under Article 346(1)(b) TFEU appears to distort 
competition in the Internal Market, for example by benefitting activities 
which are related to the products on the 1958 list mentioned in Article 346(2) 
TFEU, but are also capable of being of civilian use, or products covered by 
the list which are intended for export, the procedural requirements in 348 
TFEU shall be applied. Secondly, the Commission or any Member State may 
bring the matter directly in front of the Court, by derogation from the 
procedure in Articles 258 and 259 TFEU, if it considers that another Member 
State is misusing the ground for exemption in Article 346 TFEU, according 
to Article 348 subparagraph 2 TFEU.  
 
Furthermore, the Court explains that a Member State wishing to rely in the 
exemption in Article 346(1)(b) TFEU does not have to notify the Commission 
in advance, since the provision allows derogation from state aid laws. In 
addition, the Commission cannot use the examination procedure in Article 
108 TFEU in these circumstances.63 When Member States use Article 346 
TFEU, the consequence is a complete derogation from the Treaty rules, 
including obligations concerning EU State aid. Contrary to the situation 
concerned in Article 108 TFEU, there is no obligation for the Commission to 
adopt a decision regarding the measure concerned. In addition, the 
Commission cannot decide to address a final directive or decision to the 
Member State in question.64 It can also be noted, that the Court differentiates 
the case of Fiocchi Munizioni from the facts in Commission Decision 
1999/763/EC of 17 March 1999. In this case, the Commission initiated a 
procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU, while Germany in its defence relied 
on Article 346(1)(b) TFEU. In Fiocchi Munizioni on the other hand, the 
Commission opened bilateral examinations on the basis of Article 348(1) 
TFEU.   
 
                                                 
63 Case T-26/01, Fiocchi Munizioni v. Commission [2003] ECLI:EU:T:2003:248, para. 62.  
64 Ibid, para. 72.  
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The Case Fiocchi Munizioni confirms that the Commission is confined to the 
special procedure laid down in Article 348 TFEU when a Member State 
invokes Article 346(1)(b) TFEU, and that the Commission has the power to 
assess whether or not the arguments of the Member States are credible or not. 
Naturally, when dealing with Article 346(1)(b) TFEU, the question arises 
when the special review procedure in Article 348 TFEU shall be used instead 
of the more conventional option in Article 258 TFEU. The latter Article was 
used in Case Spanish Weapons as enforcement procedure, and no party 
invoked Article 348 TFEU which was pointed out by the Advocate General, 
“not even the Court of its own motion”.65  
 
Furthermore, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer emphasizes that the 
procedure in Article 348(2) TFEU was used once in 50 years in case 
FYROM66, thereby inclining how rarely the Article has been used.67 However, 
in the Military Export cases, Germany68 and Greece69 questioned the 
admissibility of the use of Article 258 TFEU since they had relied on Article 
346 TFEU, and therefore the Commission could not use the standard 
enforcement action but had to use the special one as prescribed in Article 348 
TFEU. According to the Court however, the Article 348 TFEU is only 
applicable when the Commission alleges that Member States have used the 
exemption in Articles 346 and 347 TFEU improperly, and in the cases in 
question the aim of the Commission was to obtain a declaration of failure to 
fulfil provisions mandatory on the basis of secondary law.70  
 
Moreover, as further stated by the Advocate General, the wording of Article 
348 TFEU does not in any language support the interpretation that the 
Commission is under the obligation to use the procedure in Article 348 TFEU, 
but it “is framed merely as a right”.71 In addition, the Advocate General 
argues that the subject matter of any legal proceedings is determined by the 
applicant and not by what the defendant claims, and the Commission in the 
present case was seeking a declaration of failure to fulfil obligations under 
Article 31 TFEU and several other secondary law provision, not on the basis 
of Article 346 TFEU which was used by the defendant. The applicant’s choice 
                                                 
65 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case 239/06 [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:784, Commission v. Italy, para. 42.  
66 Case C-120/94, Commission v. Greece [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:116.  
67 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case 239/06, Commission v. Italy, 
in footnote 26. 
68 Case C-372/05, Commission v. Germany [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:780, para. 28.  
69 Case C-409/05, Commission v. Greece [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:782, para 23.  
70 Articles 2 and 9-11 of Regulations 1552/89/EEC and 1150/2000/EC and Commission v. 
Greece para 25.  
71 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case 239/06, Commission v. Italy, 
in footnote 23. 
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of action is not made subject to argumentation by the defendant in the 
defence.72 In the end it was concluded that, since the Military Export cases 
did not involve any distortion of competition, Article 348(2) TFEU was not 
applicable, and that Article 258 TFEU does not present a disadvantage to 
Member States in comparison with Article 348 TFEU.73              
 
2.2.1.7 The Commission’s 2006 Interpretative 
Communication 
On the 7th of December 2006, the Commission’s “Interpretative 
Communication on the application of Article 296 TEC in the field of defence 
procurement” was finally released to prevent possible misinterpretation and 
misuse of Article 346 TFEU. Although the already existing case law have 
been argued to quite clearly have given guidance to the interpretation of 
Article 346(1)(b) TFEU, it was nevertheless deemed necessary to use another 
measure in order for the Member States to comply with the legislative 
framework.74 There seemed to be no impact on the actual defence 
procurement at the time, and the Member States largely ignored the case law 
due to difficulty to follow the rules, out of defiance or simply by ignorance.75   
 
The Commission identified procurement law as an area for action towards 
establishing a European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) in its 
Communication of March 2003.76 This resulted in a Green Paper on defence 
Procurement in September 2004, on which stakeholders were invited to 
comment in order to improve openness and transparency of the defence 
market.77 The consultation confirmed that the existing legal framework at the 
time did not function properly, and pointed out uncertainties regarding the 
scope of Article 296 TEC (now Article 346 TFEU) as one of two main factors 
for this. In the Communication, the divining line between what constituted 
defence acquisitions concerning Member States essential security interest and 
what did not was considered vague, at times making it unclear which rules 
that apply to which contracts. Consequently, the application of Article 296 
TEC was deemed problematic and the use of it varied considerably between 
                                                 
72 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case 239/06, Commission v. Italy, 
para. 35-37.  
73 Ibid, para. 41. 
74 Commission, ‘Green Paper on defence procurement’ (Green Paper) COM (2004) 608 
final, at 9. 
75 Martin Trybus Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 184. 
76 Commission, ‘Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy’ (Communication) 
COM(2003) 113, 11 March 2003. 
77 Commission, ‘Green Paper on defence procurement’ (Green Paper) COM (2004) 608 
final. 
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Member States.78 In response to this, the Commission adopted the 
Interpretative Communication started the preparations of what is now the 
Defence Procurement Directive.  
 
The Communication is built on existing case law. It sets out that the scope of 
Article 296 (1)(b) TEC is limited by the concept of “essential security 
interests” and the Council list of 1958 and that Article 296(1)(a) goes beyond 
defence. In addition, it is up to Member States to define and protect their 
security interests. However, exemptions must be interpreted strictly79. 
Moreover, procurement of goods and services directly related to the 
armaments on the list are said to also be covered by Article 346(1)(b) TFEU 
as well as modern, capability-oriented acquisition methods. Furthermore, the 
Communication explains that the term “specifically military purposes” shall 
be understood, as to concern only the procurement of equipment which is 
designed, developed and produced for specifically military purposes. The 
Communication is outdated on this point in the light of the recent judgement 
of Finnish Turntables80, as mentioned above. In paragraph 40 of this case, the 
Court sets forth that “specifically military purposes” refers to the “intrinsic 
characteristics of a piece of equipment specifically designed, developed or 
modified significantly for those purposes”. Consequently, this must be 
understood as the terms not being cumulative. 
 
Furthermore, the Communication explains that the application of the 
exemption is not automatic as confirmed by the Court,81 and that the article 
have been acknowledged to give Member States a broad degree of discretion 
when deciding how to best protect their essential security interests.82 
Referring to paragraph 22 in Spanish Weapons, where the Court set out that 
“it is for the Member State which seeks to rely on those exceptions to furnish 
evidence that the exemptions in question do not go beyond the limits of such 
[clearly defined]cases” and to demonstrate “that the exemptions…are 
necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security”, the 
Commission argues that “essential” is a particularly strong wording that 
limits exemptions to procurements of the highest importance for Member 
                                                 
78 Commission, ‘Interpretative communication on the application of Article 296 of the 
Treaty in the field of defence procurement’ (Communication) COM(2006) 779 final [2006]. 
79 C-367/89, Criminal Proceedings against Aimé Richardt and Les Accessories 
Scientifiques SNC [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:376, para. 20; Case 222/84 Johnston [1986] 
ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, para. 26. 
80 C-615/10 Finnish Turntables [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:324. 
81 Case C-273/97, Sirdar [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:523 para. 15-16; Case 285/98 Kreil 
[2000] ECLI:EU:C:1999:525, para. 16; Case C-186/01 Dory [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:146, 
para. 30-31. 
82 Case T-26/01, Fiocchi Munizioni v. Commission [2003] ECLI:EU:T:2003:248. 
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States’ military capabilities.83 Trybus argues that this in itself needs an 
interpretation, which is not provided by the Commission. Furthermore, the 
Interpretative Communication argues that every exemption should be made 
on a case-by-case basis “with great care”.84 
 
According to Article 288 TFEU, the Communication is not legally binding 
since that only applies to Directives, Regulations and Decisions. This has 
been further clarified by the General Court in Germany v. Commission.85 
Since the release of the Communication in 2006, several significant cases 
have been added to the pile of relevant case law, such as Agusta, Military 
Export and Finnish Turntables. However, it provides an insight in the way in 
which the Commission approaches the exemption of Article 346 TFEU. 
According to the Green Paper on Defence Procurement, the Communication 
was intended to complement the Defence Procurement Directive.86 
 
2.2.2 The secrecy exemption of Article 346(1)(a) 
TFEU 
Article 346(1)(a) TFEU provides that:  
“no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of 
which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security”. 
This rule constitutes a possibility to derogate from the general obligation of 
Member States to supply information to the institutions of the European 
Union according to secondary EU law provisions or Articles 337 TFEU87 and 
4(3) TEU.88 Therefore, the Article is only applicable if there is an obligation 
                                                 
83 Commission, ‘Interpretative communication on the application of Article 296 of the 
Treaty in the field of defence procurement’ (Communication) COM(2006) 779 final [2006], 
section 4 “Conditions of Application”. 
84 Commission, ‘Interpretative communication on the application of Article 296 of the 
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86 Commission, ‘Green Paper on defence procurement’ (Green Paper) COM (2004) 608 
final, at 9-11.  
87 Article 337 TFEU reads: “The Commission may, within the limits and under conditions 
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of the tasks entrusted to it.” 
88 Article 4 (3) TEU reads: “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union 
and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks 
which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, 
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or 
resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate 
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under EU law to supply information. This gives the Member States the 
political power to decide whether their essential security interests are 
affected. The provision is subject to the scrutiny of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, as well as to the bilateral communication between the 
Commission and a Member State as set out in Article 348(1) TFEU if the 
Commission finds it necessary.89  
 
Procurement Directives stipulate several conditions which require the 
Member States to provide information to EU institutions, such as the 
obligation to publish contract notices and contract award notices in the 
Official Journal of the EU. These obligations can be contrary to the a Member 
State’s essential security interests, due to the them letting anybody interested 
take part of the information. In the field of defence, this is not a system that 
works well in all areas. Article 346(1)(a) TFEU ensures that Member States 
have the possibility to withhold information which they deem contrary to their 
essential security interest to make public.90 
 
2.2.2.1 Violation of Article 346(1)(a) TFEU 
However, there is a risk of abuse of Article 346 (1)(a) TFEU. Member States 
are able to withhold evidence of essential necessity for the ECJ to scrutinise 
a measure taken on grounds of national security. Concerning Article 
346(1)(b) TFEU, it is up to Member States to prove that a situation is covered 
by the Article following the case of C-414/97 Spanish Weapons and 
subsequent case law. Consequently, the same obligation might compromise 
letter (a)91, when the exempted information in question is the only proof 
available. Trybus argues that the disclosure of such information is not likely 
to constitute a serious problem security wise; the Commission has previously 
proved to be able to safeguard information in matters related to competition 
law under Article 28 Regulation 1/2003/EC.92  
 
It has previously been argued that the exercise of a legitimate procedural right 
should not be used against Member States. In an EU context, this would result 
in Member States being able to refuse to disclose information when relying 
                                                 
the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise 
the attainment of the Union's objectives”. 
89 Article 348 (1) reads: “If measures taken in the circumstances referred to in Articles 346 
and 347 have the effect of distorting the conditions of competition in the internal market, 
the Commission shall, together with the State concerned, examine how these measures can 
be adjusted to the rules laid down in the Treaties”. 
90 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 129.  
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid, p. 130.  
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on Article 346 (1)(a) TFEU since the Court would accept the use of Article 
346 (1)(b) TFEU in good faith. However, the Court can scrutinise the exercise 
of the discretion in Article 346 (1)(a) by the use of the in camera procedure 
in Article 348 subparagraph 2 TFEU. The Article excludes the public from 
the proceedings, which prohibits the Member States from relying on the 
privilege in Article 346 (1)(b) TFEU to avoid supplying information to the 
Court. Moreover, the Member States cannot use the privilege if measures on 
the basis of Articles 346(1)(b) or 347 TFEU are the subject of these 
proceedings.93   
 
Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly, over time, confirmed the strict 
interpretation of Article 346 TFEU.94 This would be severely undermined if 
Member States were allowed to withhold information needed by the Court to 
scrutinise exemptions made under Article 346(1)(a) TFEU. Consequently, the 
narrow interpretation would be of symbolic meaning without real effect. 
Furthermore, a Member State who abuse letter (b) of the provision would 
likely not hesitate to abuse letter (a) to cover up the tracks. In addition, the 
Court has clearly allocated the burden of proof to the Member States. 
Moreover, Article 348 subparagraph 2 TFEU accommodates the secrecy need 
since the public is excluded. This need has further been respected when 
reading the judgement to the public, by derogation from Article 34 of the 
Statute of the Court for example. In the case of a judgement relating to Article 
348 TFEU, which has never occurred, not even the operational part is likely 
to be read out. In addition, it has been argued to be unlikely that a Member 
State abuses Article 346(1)(a) TFEU if it has been brought to Court on the 
basis of having violated Article 346(1)(b) TFEU.  This would result in an 
uncommon confrontation between a Member State and the institutions; 
Member States usually cooperate with them and follow judgements from the 
Court.95  
 
However, there is a fine balance between compromising the wide discretion 
that has been granted the Member States in the Treaty, the nature of secrecy 
and on the other hand taking the difficulties for the Commission to supply 
enough evidence when a disproportionate use of the conditions in Article 
346(1)(a) TFEU has occurred. Trybus suggests that a similar evidence rule 
for all defence exceptions should be used, which would result in Article 
346(1)(a) TFEU not being able to be used as a defence against the obligation 
to submit information in order to find evidence of a violation. Looking at 
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cases Spanish Weapons and Military Weapons, Article 348 TFEU is a special 
procedure and Article 258 TFEU is the enforcement procedure used in 
practice.  
 
2.2.2.2 Intensity of Scrutiny: German Military Export 
Until recently, the standard of review in Article 346(1)(a) TFEU was unclear. 
In the Military Export cases, some Member States argued that they were under 
no obligation to provide the Commission with the necessary information 
which the Commission needed to prove the alleged infringement. In German 
Military Exports, Germany argued that the used enforcement action in Article 
258 TFEU was inadmissible since the Commission could not prove that there 
had been an infringement, due to the nature of the case96; since the Member 
States were not obliged to provide the information requested by the 
Commission regarding their exports, it was not possible for the Commission 
to prove any infringement. Furthermore, Germany claimed that it did not have 
to hand over the information in question, and that the action was inadmissible 
because it was based on an alleged failure to fulfil Treaty obligations which 
could not be proved.   
 
The Court did not accept this line of reasoning, and stated the Member States 
must make the information in question available to the Commission to permit 
inspection according to Article 4(3) TEU, in order to make sure that the 
transfer of the EU own resources is correct. Although, Member States can still 
“on a case-by-case basis and by way of exception, on the basis of Article 346 
TFEU, either restrict the information sent to certain parts of a document or 
withhold it completely”.  
 
Trybus argues that even though the judgement concerned Article 346 TFEU 
as a whole, it is clear that the part regarding exemption from the obligation to 
provide information refers to Article 346(1)(a) TFEU. The judgement is the 
first ruling concerning Article 346(1)(a) TFEU, and an exemption was not 
allowed. The “case-by-case” exemption was clearly expressed, and in 
German Export, the Court ruled on this to apply to the exemption as a 
whole.97. The Court did not use the word “necessary”, but it did examine the 
arguments from the state of Germany thoroughly by analysing the safeguards 
of confidentiality in place and deeming them to be sufficient for the secrecy 
requirements concerned. Accordingly, the exemption in Article 346(1)(a) 
TFEU is not automatic nor categorical, just as the second exemption of the 
Article, letter (b). Moreover, it has to be interpreted narrowly, on a case-by-
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case basis, as an exception, it has to be specifically invoked and Member 
States has the burden of proof. There is no specific mentioning of a 
proportionality test, but in the light of the courts previous assessment of 
Article 346(1)(b) TFEU and the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in 
Commission v. Austria it can be assumed to exist.98  
 
Moreover, Article 346(1)(a) TFEU was officially addressed in case ZZ (C-
300/11) in 2013, were the Court was asked if the principle of effective judicial 
protection could be set aside on the basis of Article 346(1)(a) TFEU and the 
interests of State security, by not informing a Union citizen of the essence of 
the grounds against him.99 ZZ was a dual French and Algerian citizen residing 
in the United Kingdom, and he was denied entry due to public safety reasons 
after travelling outside of the UK. The question referred to the Court 
concerned whether or not the United Kingdom was allowed to not disclose 
the essence of the grounds of its decision on the basis of Article 346(1)(a) 
TFEU and State security among other provisions. The Court stated once 
more, that the mere fact that a decision concerns State security does not result 
in European Union law being inapplicable. 
 
2.2.2.3 A glimpse into the future: Commission v. 
Austria 
In the pending Case C-187/16, Commission v. Austria, the Court has the 
chance to give further guidance on the interpretation of Article 346(1)(a) 
TFEU. The Commission alleges that Austria has infringed EU public 
procurement law, due to Austria by law exclusively reserved the manufacture 
of security-related documents for the private undertaking Österreichische 
Staatsdruckerei GmbH, which was formerly owned by the State of Austria. 
Austria relied on its essential national security interests, since Staatsdruckerei 
alone demonstrated the appropriate organisational, technical and structural 
security measures for performing contracts such as protection of secret 
information. The Commission argued that it is possible to organise a public 
invitation to tender in a way where the only successful parties could be 
undertakings specialized in manufacture of documents subject to special 
security requirements and were supervised accordingly.  
 
In the Opinion released on the 20 of July 2017, Advocate General Kokott 
begins by repeating the general character of Article 346(1)(a) TFEU, as 
opposed to Article 346(1)(b) TFEU it is not limited to arms, munitions and 
war material but can be applied to non-military procurement processes as 
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well. As established in case law, essential security interests constitute a 
concept of EU law which must interpreted autonomously. Furthermore, the 
wide discretion of Member States to define this which was set out in Fiocchi 
Munizioni is acknowledged. However, Advocate General Kokott precedes by 
reminding the Court of its reasoning in Case C-414/97 Commission v. Spain, 
where the Court stated that the provisions in Article 346 TFEU do not make 
it possible for Member States to derogate from their duties under EU law 
based on no more than reliance on their essential national security interests. 
Furthermore, Advocate General Kokott argues that it is up to the Member 
States to offer substantiated evidence in each case in order to show precisely 
which national security interests are affected and to what extent compliance 
with EU law would interfere with those security interests.100 
 
In addition, she sets forth that even if the Commission is correct, it is 
nevertheless undeniable that the factors mentioned (authencity and protection 
against counterfeiting for official documents, protection of the security 
arrangements for the manufacturing of them) can affect essential national 
security interests. Moreover she states, the resolution in this case depends on 
if the security interests and measures can justify a complete derogation from 
EU law, regarding public contracts. After reminding the Court of the strict 
interpretation of Article 346(1)(a) TFEU, Advocate General Kokott states that 
it is up to the Member States to prove that it is necessary to use the exemption 
in order to protect its essential security interests. Interestingly, she explicitly 
states that “the Member Stare concerned must therefore ultimately undergo a 
proportionality test”. Moreover, not wanting to disclose security-related 
information to foreign entities or entities controlled by foreign nationals, 
especially entities or persons from states outside of the EU, is put forward as 
examples of justified derogations.101  
 
Another point of interest is the fact that the Advocate General, instead of 
dismissing the Austrian law because the exemptions in Article 346 TFEU 
among other factors only is supposed to be applied on a case-by-case basis 
and therefore not in a national code102 or consequently assumingly in a 
national piece of legislation, refers to a different line of case law. According 
to those, a measure is only appropriate for ensuring attainment of the objective 
pursued “if it genuinely reflects a concern to attain it in a consistent and 
systematic manner”. Since Austria had not taken any measures to ensure that 
Straatsdruckerei did not fall under the control of foreign stakeholders, 
Advocate General Kokott found there to be no security-related justification 
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for the categorical derogation, and therefore states that Austria has failed to 
fulfil its obligations under the Treaty.103 Furthermore, it is mentioned that this 
case gives the Court of Justice the opportunity to go beyond procurement and 
further develop the scope and limits of Article 346 TFEU.104  
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3 The Defence Procurement 
Directive 
In 2011-2015, the overall value of defence procurement expenditure by the 
28 EU Member States and EEA countries ranged between EUR 81 to 82 
billion per year. The Directive’s main objective is to ensure that defence and 
sensitive security procurement in that market is carried out under EU rules 
based on competition, transparency and equal treatment. According to the 
Commission, the Directive seeks to achieve this by providing tailor-made 
rules for such procurement, and thereby limiting the use of exemptions such 
as Article 346 TFEU, to exceptional cases. Consequently, the Directive works 
as a tool in supporting the establishment of an open and competitive European 
defence equipment market and seeks to strengthen the competitiveness of the 
European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB).  
 
The uptake of the Directive has shown a steady upward trend since it entered 
into force. The value of defence and security contracts awarded under the 
Directive has increased more than tenfold, to reach a total turnover of 
approximately EUR 30.85 billion.105 However, the use of the Directive is 
unevenly distributed between the Member States. Before the Directive’s 
adoption, 18 Member States maintained offsets regulations systematically. 
The Commission took the stance in its Evaluation Report of the Defence 
Procurement Directive, that these regulations were clearly incompatible both 
with the EU treaties and with the correct transposition and application of the 
Defence Procurement Directive. According to the report, Member States have 
now either abolished or revised their offsets regulations. The remaining 
regulations provide that offsets/industrial return can only be required, 
following a case-by-case analysis, if the conditions of Article 346 TFEU are 
met. Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledged the challenge of ensuring 
that the strict conditions of Article 346 TFEU are met in practice.  
 
Moreover, the Commission concluded that the text of the Directive was 
sufficient to its purpose, and that it was moving towards achieving its 
objective. The Commission explicitly stated that an amendment of the text 
was not necessary, and it refrained from putting forward a legislative 
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proposal.106 Given that this report was published in 2016, it is likely that the 
text will stay unchanged at least for the near future. However, the 
Commission presented a number of ways forward, such as seeking out the 
Member States concerned where the implementation has not given desired 
results. This have recently been demonstrated; on the 25th of January 2018, 
the Commission opened infringement procedures against five Member States 
for not applying EU rules on public procurement in defence and security 
markets correctly.107  
 
3.1 Scope 
The Directive is applicable to contracts awarded in the area of defence and 
security regarding the supply of military equipment (including any parts, 
components and/or subassemblies thereof) as well as the works and services 
concerning specifically military purposes or sensitive works and services. 
Articles 30, 45, 46, 55 and 296 TFEU is exempted from the principles of the 
Treaty, and consequently from secondary law originating from these.108 
Therefore, no provisions in the Defence Procurement Directive should 
prohibit the imposition or application of measures necessary for the protection 
of the interests justified by these Articles in the Treaty. The Defence 
Procurement Directive  does not have to be applied when awarding contract 
in the scope of the Directive  if it can be justified by reasons such as public 
security or by the protection of a Member States’ essential security interests. 
This can be the case when extremely high demands on security of supply is 
required, or when the  contract concerned is so secret and/or important for 
national sovereignty that the Articles in this Directive is not sufficient to 
guarantee the Member States essential security interest. The definition of this 
is the sole responsibility of the Member States.109 This can be the case 
especially where contracts are of such a sensitive nature that the mere 
existence of them must be kept secret.110  
 
Moreover, the Court has stated that the possibility to derogate from the 
Defence Procurement Directive should only be allowed if it is strictly 
necessary to protect the legitimate interests that articles such as 346 TFEU 
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safeguard. Derogations from the Directive must therefore be proportionate to 
the pursued goal and cause as little disturbance to the free movement of goods 
and services as possible.111 Furthermore, the Council and European 
Parliament encourages the Member States in the preamble of the Defence 
Procurement Directive to base their decisions regarding contracts in arms, 
munitions and war material on what is most economically beneficial and by 
doing so taking into account the need for a globally competitive European 
Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), the need for open and 
fair markets and to obtain mutual benefits.112    
 
In addition, Article 13 TFEU specifically excludes the Defence Procurement 
Directive from contracts awarded by a government to another government 
regarding the supply of military or sensitive equipment, works and services 
directly linked to such equipment or to specifically military purposes, 
sensitive works and sensitive services. Neither does the Directive apply when 
Member States would be forced to disclose information which it considers 
contrary to the essential interests of its security. Contracts, were at least two 
Member States participate in a cooperative programme based on research and 
development of a new product, are excluded from the application of the 
Defence Procurement Directive. When such a cooperation between Member 
States is concluded, it shall be indicated to the Commission by the Member 
States the share of research and development expenditure in relation to the 
overall cost of the programme, the cost-sharing agreement and the expected 
share of purchase per Member State, if any.  
 
3.2 Security of supply 
After determining that the contracting entity and the contract is within the 
scope of the Defence Procurement Directive , and the appropriate procedure 
has been chosen, one of the remaining factors to consider is the need of 
security of supply. It is not explicitly defined in the Defence Procurement 
Directive; however the (non-binding) Commission’s Guidance Note Security 
of Supply defines the term as “a guarantee of supply of goods and services 
sufficient for a Member State to discharge its defence and security 
commitments in accordance with its foreign and security policy 
requirements”.113 Moreover, the Guidance Note defines the concept of 
security of supply as broad, which covers a wide range of industrial, legal, 
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technological and political aspects, and includes the ability of Member States 
to use their armed forces with a sufficient degree of national control. The 
notion of security and supply in the Defence Procurement Directive is 
motivated by the need for Member States, in times of peace and war, to secure 
the access to relevant supplies such as goods, services and works. The life 
cycle of contracts in the Defence Procurement Directive and in other relevant 
international agreements is usually long, and the security of supply is 
necessary both initially and onwards.  
 
It is essential for an efficient national defence and security and consequently 
national security as well. According to the Commission’s Guidance Note 
Security of Supply, the Member States need a “guarantee”, “control” and “no 
third-party constraints”. Without these, the effective use of the armed forces 
and other security activities can be compromised or undermined. Risk factors 
include unreliable economic operators in the supply chain, disrupted transport 
etc., if a country between the purchasing Member State and the supplying 
State would be occupied and therefore cutting of supply for example. 
However, the need to ensure a security of supply can be relevant in domestic 
contracts as well, although the degree of control by the Member State is 
severely reduced once the supply is located in another country. This is 
addressed in the 2007 Commission Staff Working Document. Furthermore, it 
can be noted that defence and security transfers must be authorised following 
requirements in the state of production, which in an EU context relates to the 
Intra-Community Transfers Directive. This Directive was a part of the 
“Defence Package” just as the Defence Procurement Directive, and Trybus 
argues that these measures are intended to reduce the importance of security 
of supply in practice over time, in favour of the Internal Market.  
 
3.2.1 Possible requirements under Article 23 of 
the Defence Procurement Directive 
Article 23 of the Defence Procurement Directive concerns security of supply 
and allows requirements for the transfer, export and transit of products.  
Article 23 subparagraph 2(a) of the Defence Procurement Directive sets out 
that the following requirement may be included in the contract 
documentation: “certification or documentation demonstrating to the 
satisfaction of the contracting authority/entity that the tenderer will be able 
to honour its obligations regarding the export, transfer and transit of goods 
associated with the contract, including any supporting documentation 
received from the Member State(s) concerned”. This enables the contracting 
authority to protect itself from the potential risk of “refusal, withdrawal or 
delay of relevant export and transfer authorisations, but also possible 
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conditions linked to these authorisations”.114 The Guidance Note on Security 
of Supply sets forth a non-exhaustive list of examples of requirements that 
can be included and that cannot be included. Under an individual licences 
regime, the economic operator cannot be required to guarantee that a licence 
will be granted. Trybus argues that this would be discriminatory, since an 
economic operator cannot guarantee the behaviour of its national licensing 
authority. Therefore, the requirement must be that the economic operator can 
show that it has done or will do, everything necessary to acquire the desired 
licence.115     
Article 23 subparagraph 2(b) of the Defence Procurement Directive allows 
the following requirements to be included in the contract documentation: “the 
indication of any restriction on the contracting authority/entity regarding 
disclosure, transfer or use of the products and services or any result of those 
products and services, which would result from export control or security 
arrangements”. The Guidance Note on Security of Supply explains that this 
concerns the “so called ‘black boxes’ and ‘anti-tamper devices’”, which are 
subsystems and components that forms an integral part of the equipment that 
needs to be purchased but cannot be modified or accessed by the supplier or 
purchaser.116 The risk addressed here is the same as in letter (a), that of 
withdrawal, refusal or delay of necessary authorisation. This allows the 
contracting authority to react to the risk, while the tenderer needs to inform 
the contracting authority comprehensively of any relevant restrictions.  
Article 23 subparagraph 2(c) of the Defence Procurement Directive sets out 
that the following requirements can be included in the contract 
documentation, which relates to the organisation of the supply chain: 
“certification or documentation demonstrating that the organisation and 
location of the tenderer’s supply chain will allow it to comply with the 
requirements of the contracting authority/entity concerning security of supply 
set out in the contract documents, and a commitment to ensure that possible 
changes in its supply chain during the execution of the contract will not affect 
adversely compliance with these requirements”. The risk addressed here is 
that of disruptions in transportations or through problems with licensing in 
relation to subcontractors in the supply chain. This provision enables the 
contracting authority to ensure the stability and reliability of the chain; 
disruptions here can affect the security of supply just as much as if it would 
occur with the prime contractor, and the contracting authority might have 
even less control.  Moreover, requirements concerning the future changes in 
                                                 
114 Commission ‘Guidance Note Security of Supply’ (Guidance Note), 2016 p. 10.  
115 Martin Trybus, Buying Defence and Security in Europe (Cambridge University Press 
2014), p. 361. 
116 Commission ‘Guidance Note Security of Supply’ (Guidance Note), 2016 p. 12. 
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the supply chain represent a more general commitment compared to 
requirements related to the time of the tender.117  
In addition, supply chains involving only operators from EU Member States 
are separated from supply chains which includes operators from a third 
country. Trybus validly points out that this should be further differentiated; a 
supply chain which only involves operators from the Member State of the 
prime contractor implies even fewer risks. Furthermore, the Guidance Note 
on Security of Supply emphasizes the principle of non-discrimination on the 
basis of nationality, which accordingly only allows for “objective and 
performance-based considerations”. However, one such consideration can be 
geography in relation to transportation, but not in relation to national territory. 
Nevertheless, all requirements need to comply with EU Internal Market law, 
including the principle of proportionality.118 
Furthermore, Article 23 subparagraph 2(d) and (e) of the Defence 
Procurement Directive allows requirements concerning additional needs 
resulting from a crisis. Article 23 subparagraph 2(d) of the Defence 
Procurement Directive allows requiring: “a commitment from the tenderer to 
establish and/or maintain the capacity required to meet additional needs 
required by the contracting authority/entity as a result of a crisis, according 
to terms and conditions to be agreed”. Article 23 subparagraph 2(e) of the 
Defence Procurement Directive allows requiring: “any supporting 
documentation received from the tenderer’s national authorities regarding 
the fulfilment of additional needs required by the contracting authority/entity 
as a result of a crisis”. 
The purpose of these provisions is to safeguard against the risk related to 
additional needs that might arise due to a crisis, but was not a part of the 
original contract. Article 1(10) of the Defence Procurement Directive defines 
the term “crisis”. Moreover, this provision is less relevant according to the 
Guidance Note on Security of Supply, since these requirements concern the 
conditions of the contract after it has been awarded, and thus not a situation 
that would provide a ground for derogation from the Directive.119 Trybus 
points out the important aspect that in a crisis, there is a risk that several 
contracting authorities have additional needs and therefore the economic 
operator might be overwhelmed. Consequently, this might be of interest to 
address.120 In addition, a crisis can justify the use of the negotiated procedure 
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without prior publication of a contract notice on the basis of Article 28(1)(c) 
of the Defence Procurement Directive.  
Article 23 subparagraph 2(f) of the Defence Procurement Directive sets out 
that contracting authorities and entities can require: “a commitment from the 
tenderer to carry out the maintenance, modernisation or adaptation of the 
supplies covered by the contract”. This concerns follow-on work according 
to the Guidance Note Security of Supply, and serves to protect the contracting 
authorities from the risk that important maintenance, adaptions and 
modernisations needed for the operability of the concerned equipment are not 
performed, which compromises the utility and therefore national security.  
Due to the long life cycle of defence related contracts, this can be considered 
to cover in the initial supply contract. The Commission recommends “to 
specify such a commitment with more detailed stipulations on the nature and 
content of the maintenance, modernisation or adaptation to be performed, 
including, if possible, at least a general agreement on prices”.121  
Moreover, Article 23 subparagraph 2(g) of the Defence Procurement 
Directive enables contracting authorities and entities to require: “a 
commitment from the tenderer to inform the contracting authority/entity in 
due time of any change in its organisation, supply chain or industrial strategy 
that may affect its obligations to that authority/entity”. The risk addressed 
here is that of being surprised by business decisions affecting security of 
supply. This requirement give the contracting authority time to address these 
changes. Considering changes in supply chain, letters (g) and (c) should be 
read together.  
Lastly, according to Article 23 subparagraph 2(h) of the Defence Procurement 
Directive, contracting authorities are allowed to require: “a commitment from 
the tenderer to provide the contracting authority/entity, according to terms 
and conditions to be agreed, with all specific means necessary for the 
production of spare parts, components, assemblies and special testing 
equipment, including technical drawings, licenses and instructions for use, in 
the event that it is no longer able to provide these supplies”. This commitment 
provides a safeguard against the risk of ceasing production of military or 
security equipment, due to bankruptcy or business decision. This provision 
enables the contracting authority to take over the production if the economic 
operator ceased production, making the production in-house. This is 
potentially the heaviest requirement since it transfers considerable assets and 
intellectual property to the contracting authority.122   
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3.3 Security of information  
Security of information is not explicitly defined in the Defence Procurement 
Directive, however the Commission’s Guidance Note Security of Information 
clarifies the notion as “the ability and the reliability of economic operators to 
protect classified information”.123 It is described as “a particularly important 
feature” of the Defence Procurement Directive due to the “sensitive nature of 
many defence and security procurements”. Since the exemption concerns the 
“ability and reliability of economic operators”, it affects the qualification and 
selection of tenderers as well as the rules on contract conditions, award 
criteria and publication of the contract.124 The Commission Staff Working 
Document further sets out that security of classified information needs to be 
safeguarded throughout the life cycle of the contract and even its 
performance.125 Classified information is defined in Article 1(8) of the 
Defence Procurement Directive as:  
 
“any information or material, regardless of the form, nature or mode of 
transmission thereof, to which a certain level of security classification or 
protection has been attributed, and which, in the interests of national security 
and in accordance with the laws, regulations or administrative provisions in 
force in the Member State concerned, requires protection against any 
misappropriation, destruction, removal, disclosure, loss or access by any 
unauthorised individual, or any other type of compromise.” 
 
However, there is no EU security of information regime and the Member 
States are in charge of which information that needs to be classified, the level 
of confidentiality and to grant the necessary security clearances, which are 
not automatically recognized by the other Member States. Article 7 of the 
Defence Procurement Directive enables contracting entities to impose 
requirements on prime contractors and subcontractors in order to protect 
classified information throughout the tendering and contracting phases. 
Article 22 of the Defence Procurement Directive however, allows 
requirements aimed to secure the protection of classified information on the 
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required level of security through contract performance conditions.126 These 
performance conditions include a commitment to safeguard information on 
subcontractors and confidentiality.  
 
The commitment to safeguard confidentiality enables the contracting 
authorities and entities to set out two requirements, as can be found in Article 
22 subparagraph 2(a) and (b) of the Defence Procurement Directive. Firstly, 
they may require “a commitment from the tenderer and the subcontractors 
already identified to appropriately safeguard the confidentiality of all 
classified information in their possession or coming to their notice throughout 
the duration of the contract and after termination or conclusion of the 
contract, in accordance with the relevant laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions”, according to Article 22 subparagraph 2(a) of the 
Directive. Furthermore, Article 22 subparagraph 2(b) of the Defence 
Procurement Directive provides the possibility to require “a commitment from 
the tenderer to obtain the commitment provided in point (a) from other 
subcontractors to which it will subcontract during the execution of the 
contract”.   
 
The Guidance Note Security of Information sets out that letter (b) allows for 
verification using security clearances of the tenderer’s “general ability to 
safeguard classified information at the required level”. Moreover, the 
contracting authority may require a commitment from the prime contractor 
and its already identified subcontractors to safeguard the confidentiality of all 
classified information that is in their possession or will come to their 
information during and after the contract, according to letter (a). As stated in 
the Guidance Note, the two letters constitute a compliment to the selection 
criterion in Article 42(1)(j) of the Defence Procurement Directive and results 
in a system were the contracting authority is able to first make sure that only 
reliable operators fulfilling the necessary requirements are invited to tender, 
and secondly that they are responsible for ensuring that the classified 
protection is adequately protected.127    
 
Article 22 subparagraph 2(c) and (d) of the Defence Procurement Directive 
are focused on subcontractors involved in the procurement process. 
According to letter (c), the contracting authorities or entities are allowed to 
require sufficient information on already identified subcontractors in order to 
ensure that the subcontractors fulfil the capabilities necessary to 
“appropriately safeguard the confidentiality of the classified information to 
                                                 
126 Tim Briggs ”The New Defence Procurement Directive” (Public Procurement Law 
Review 2009).  
127 Commission ‘Guidance Note Security of Information’ (Guidance Note), para. 17. 
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which they have access or which they are required to produce when carrying 
out their subcontracting activities”. Moreover, letter (d) sets forth that they 
also may require that the same apply to any new subcontractor before 
awarding a subcontract.  
 
This information will be materialised as certificates handed out by the 
national or designated security authority of the tenderer will ensure that all 
subcontractors involved in the relevant chain of supply hold the necessary 
national clearances regarding security, according to the Guidance Note 
Security of Information.128 As a result, potential contractors will be able to 
consult these authorities concerning what constitutes relevant information in 
the procurement in question. Since defence and security contracts in general 
have longer supply chains of contractors, and due to the natural sensitivity of 
these contracts, it is necessary to verify the reliability of subcontractors.129   
 
3.4 Offset requirements 
Offsets constitutes the practise of Governments to require industrial 
compensation as a condition of granting contracts for their defence and 
security supplies. Offsets come in a variety of forms; they can be direct, 
indirect or a combination of both. Direct offsets concerns the performance of 
the contract and include local subcontracting, technology transfer, training 
requirements or co-production. Indirect offsets are not related to the 
concerned matter of procurement. It may take the form of civil offsets, such 
as obliging foreign bidders to invest in the customer’s local economy or to 
procure a counter-trade in exports of civil goods or services of a specific value 
(often 100 % of the contract price). Indirect offsets can also be military, for 
example sub-contracts awarded by the supplier to local defence companies 
for other military products. Offsets have previously been a regular practice of 
governments inside and outside Europe, however the possibility to use offsets 
has been severely limited by the European Commission in order to promote 
greater international competition and transparency in defence procurement. 
Moreover, offsets is considered as an obstacle to create an open European 
Defence Equipment Market (EDEM). One of the main reasons to why offsets, 
until recently, have been left largely untouched is their perceived politically 
sensitive nature: offset requirements can provide several work positions and 
opening of factories etc.130 
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In the recently published Guidance Note on Offsets from 2016, the 
Commission states that the requirements of offsets constitute a breach of the 
basic principles of the Treaty since they discriminate against economic 
operators, goods, and services from other Member States, and obstruct the 
free movement of goods and services on the Internal Market. Since offsets 
violate primary law, it cannot be tolerated or regulated under secondary law 
such as the Defence Procurement Directive.131 This is why offsets are not 
regulated or even mentioned in the Defence Procurement Directive. Since 
offsets impose an economic return in the national industry of the purchasing 
Member State, they violate Article 18 TFEU which prohibits discrimination 
on the ground of nationality. Furthermore, offset requirements constitute 
measures having equivalent effect as quantitative restrictions on import and 
export, which violate Articles 34 and 45 TFEU regulating the free movement 
of goods. Moreover, the freedom to provide services in Articles 56 and 62 
TFEU is violated as well.132  
 
However, when Article 346 TFEU or another EU law exemption is rightfully 
invoked, the Directive does not apply according to Article 2 and Recital 16 
of the Defence Procurement Directive. This is the case for prime contractors 
carrying out the offset obligations that are located outside of the EU as well.  
Since offset requirements discriminate in favour of subcontractors located in 
the contracting Member State, they are in breach with EU law. Therefore, the 
Court has held that offsets, like all measures adopted on the basis of EU law 
exemptions, need to be justified on a case-by-case basis and cannot be used 
to promote a purpose of purely economic nature.133 Consequently, offsets 
cannot be justified when they mainly aim to boost national employment or 
industries. Nevertheless, offset requirements that are genuinely intended to 
protect a Member State’s essential security interests, and that have 
economically advantageous side effects, are not automatically unlawful. 
However, they still need to comply with the principle of proportionality; that 
they do not go beyond what is appropriate and necessary to protect the 
essential security interests, and that this protection cannot be achieved by the 
use of less restrictive measures.   
 
Furthermore, it is difficult to argue that offset requirements contribute to 
security of supply for military equipment when they are indirect and concern 
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the civil sector or non-military equipment.134 Consequently, they appear 
difficult to justify on the ground of national security in the light of the wording 
of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU “such measures shall not adversely affect the 
conditions of competition in the internal market regarding products which 
are not intended for specifically military purposes”.      
 
3.5 Government-to-government contracts 
Article 13 (f) of the Defence Procurement Directive exempts “contracts 
awarded by a government to another government relating to: (i) the supply 
of military equipment or sensitive equipment, (ii) works and services directly 
linked to such equipment, or (iii) works and services specifically for military 
purposes, or sensitive works and sensitive services” due to the common 
practice of one government procuring military supplies, work and services 
from another country’s government. Since contracts between governments do 
not involve purchase from a private operator, they are not public procurement 
- the products or services concerned have already been procured by the selling 
government. Reasons for doing this might be to strengthen coalitions or 
improve interoperability in the battlefield, or due to security concerns (e.g. 
controlling the sale of weapons/limiting access to sensitive technology).135  
 
This exclusion is related to the in-house exemption established by the Court 
in case law, which concerns purchases within the same contracting authority 
or between the contracting authority and a body over which the authority 
exercises a comparable level of control as it does over its own departments.  
 
Article 1(9) of the Defence Procurement Directive defines a government as 
the State, regional or local government of a Member State or third country, 
and this definition is used when identifying government-to-government 
contracts according to the Guidance Note Defence and Security-specific 
Exclusions. Furthermore, a “regional or local government entity having its 
own personality” is included. However, “contracts concluded by, or on behalf 
of, other contracting authorities/entities such as bodies governed by public 
law or public undertakings” are not exempted. The scope of the exemption 
thus excludes all bodies governed by public law, and is consequently quite 
narrow. Regarding material on the other hand, the scope is rather wide. A 
“broad range of very different purchases” concerning service contracts, is 
included. Regarding supply contracts, the exemption primarily focus on sales 
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of equipment delivered from existing stocks (such as used items or items no 
longer considered necessary and therefore surplus).136  
 
The current wording includes new items137, which according to Trybus can 
result in abuse if Member State A buys military equipment from a private 
company with the intention of selling it to Member State B. The Guidance 
Note Defence and Security-specific Exclusions states that only the contract 
between the two governments is excluded from the scope of the Defence 
Procurement Directive, not the contract between the selling government and 
the economic operator it buys from. Therefore, Member State A is obliged to 
ensure that the purchased equipment in the example is procured in accordance 
with the Defence Procurement Directive. Regardless in this example, the 
safeguard clause in Article 11 of the Defence Procurement Directive applies, 
which states that “None of the rules, procedures, programmes, agreements, 
arrangements or contracts referred to in this section may be used for the 
purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Directive”. It is a general 
provision, which would catch the intention of Member State A to circumvent 
the Defence Procurement Directive.  
 
Trybus argues that the exemption of surplus items is conventional since it 
does not constitute public procurement due to no involvement of a private 
operator. Therefore, an explicit exemption of the Defence Procurement 
Directive would not be required. However, there is no definition of what 
surplus means. In order to distinguish between surplus and new items it needs 
to be clarified how long the equipment in question has to be stored by the 
selling government. Trybus states, that by wrongly labelling new equipment 
as surplus and then selling it, a Member State government is able to 
circumvent the Defence Procurement Directive, consequently defying the 
objective of the Directive and the Internal Market. However, this would again 
be caught by the safeguard clause in Article 11 of the Directive. Nevertheless, 
such an intention might be difficult to prove. Another issue is whether or not 
the equipment was procured before or after the transposition deadline of the 
Defence Procurement Directive, since it has established higher levels of 
transparency and non-discriminatory procedures.138  
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Regarding the exemption of new equipment, it is only the contract between 
the selling government and the buying government that is excluded from the 
Defence Procurement Directive, not the contract between the selling 
government and the entity it bought the equipment from. Legal problems 
arising from this situation can for example be if the contract is valued below 
the thresholds of the Defence Procurement Directive when it was procured, 
but is valued above the thresholds afterwards when the selling government 
has the object of the procurement in its possession.  
 
Trybus argues that such a contract cannot be in the scope of the exemption in 
Article 13 (f), and therefore needs to be procured on the basis of the Defence 
Procurement Directive, since the general rule is that exemptions of the 
Directive shall be interpreted narrowly. However, only when both the selling 
and the buying government are EU Member States. The Guidance Note 
Defence and Security-specific Exclusions states that an EU Member State is 
not allowed to buy military equipment from a government of a third country, 
outside the EU, in order to circumvent the Defence Procurement Directive. 
Especially not when “market conditions are such that competition within the 
Internal Market would be possible”.139 This refers to the general safeguard 
clause in Article 11 of the Defence Procurement Directive. The Guidance 
Note focuses on new equipment, as it would be practically impossible to 
require countries such as the USA and Australia to have procured used 
equipment in line with the European Defence Procurement Directive.  
 
Moreover, the Commission seems to have taken on an increasingly stricter 
interpretation of the exemption grounds. Commissioner Michel Barnier 
warned Bulgaria and Romania in 2012 that they might be violating the 
Defence Procurement Directive if they proceeded with the planned purchase 
of fighter jets from the stocks of Portugal’s existing fleet.140 The details of the 
proposed transactions are not public in their entirety, but the planes were used 
which would put the deal within the exemption in Article 13 (f) according to 
the Commission’s Guidance Note on Defence and Security specific 
exclusions. Still, Barnier argued that the exclusion never can be applied when 
a competition for the contract can be found within the internal market. 
Barnier's office later referred to the safeguard clause in Article 11.141 In the 
following Communication on the defence and security sector, the 
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Commission in 2013 stated that government-to-government contracts 
appeared to be interpreted in a way which circumvents the aim of the 
Directive and that the Commission will take steps to clarify the limits.142 
 
Trybus states that the Guidance Note in this regard is unclear concerning the 
interpretation of Article 13 (f) and third countries, but suggests a narrow 
interpretation of the exemption. This would be the line with the general 
attitude in settled case law.143 Again, the safeguard clause in Article 11 
applies where there is a warning to not abuse the government-to-government 
exemption. Abusing the government-to-government exemption may result in 
the Commission initiating an infringement procedure under Article 258 
TFEU, and ultimately bring an action before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, or private litigation in national courts. 
 
If it would be possible for a Member State to circumvent the Defence 
Procurement Directive and the complications of including both Member 
States and third-country operators in a procurement procedure by purchasing 
from a third country government, Article 13 (f) of the Directive would 
become a loophole and undermine the Internal Market. The Court has never 
allowed that, which can be seen in several cases that have been codified in 
the safeguard clause of Article 11 of the Defence Procurement Directive. In 
this regard, the Guidance Note seems to prioritise the EU Internal Market - 
and procurement on the basis of the Defence Procurement Directive - over 
third country government-to-government purchase.  
 
Trybus argues that a purchase of a new item from a third-country government 
only can be exempt through Article 13 (f) of the Directive when that purchase 
cannot be procured in the EU, due to no providers (and therefore no 
competitors) of that equipment existing within the Internal Market. The 
objectives of the Defence Procurement Directive include competition and the 
free movement of goods and services in the Internal Market. According to 
Trybus, it would require a very wide interpretation of the government-to-
government exemption and considerable compromising of the purchase from 
some third countries when the product or service could be procured in the EU, 
when there is competition in the Internal Market.144  
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4 Analysis and Conclusions 
4.1 The scope of Article 346 TFEU  
As stated in Fiocchi Munizioni (para. 58) and later codified in Recital 16 in 
the Defence Procurement Directive, it is the sole responsibility of Member 
States to define their essential security interests. However, the Court has 
repeatedly confirmed that Member States cannot simply refer to those 
interests in order to depart from EU law; exemptions are limited to 
exceptional and clearly defined cases, and the measures taken cannot go 
beyond the limits of these cases. The grounds for exemption are to be 
interpreted narrowly, and the burden of proof is on the Member State 
invoking it. This concerns the whole of Article 346 TFEU, and therefore 
applies to letter (a) and (b). This makes sense; the exemption needs to be 
interpreted narrowly for the very introduction of a Defence Procurement 
Directive to be worthwhile. Due to the limited amount of case law regarding 
Article 346(1)(a) TFEU specifically, it is difficult to distinguish a potential 
difference in the Court’s intensity of scrutiny when assessing the two 
provisions.  
 
What can be said about the Court’s attitude in judgements involving 346(1)(b) 
TFEU, is that a measure is deemed disproportionate when the article is used 
in bad faith and when it has been clearly unnecessary on the basis of national 
security. Moreover, the same applies if the measure adopted by a Member 
State damages the Internal Market more than necessary. This can be seen in 
Spanish Weapons, were Spain supported its national defence export 
companies by exempting them from VAT on the basis of Article 346(1)(b) 
TFEU, and the Military Exports cases, were several Member States made 
imports of military equipment duty-free by relying on the same provision. 
However, it is difficult to determine the limit of “more than necessary”. It can 
be argued that the Court should apply a low threshold in this regard, due to 
the matter being national security. Considering previous case law such as 
Fiocchi Munizioni and recital 16 in the Defence Procurement directive, this 
makes sense. The Member States are given a wide space to manoeuvre; it is 
up to them to define the term essential security interest and Article 346(1)(b) 
TFEU is said to have a general effect and is intended to preserve the freedom 
of action of Member States. At the same time, Article 346 TFEU is to be 
interpreted narrowly. Consequently, more guidance such as case law is 
needed to assess the balance between these two.  
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It can also be noted that the majority of cases before the Court regarding 
Article 346 TFEU was initiated by the Commission, and the Commission 
seems to have been aiming for low hanging fruit considering the background 
facts and success rate. The Member States’ reliance on Article 346 TFEU has 
been weakly argued for and often been clearly disproportionate, such as the 
national code in Agusta and Spanish Weapons as well as Military Exports 
mentioned above. The Commission seem to be going for similar fruit again 
following the recent infringement proceedings against five Member States 
concerning the direct award of a number of defence contracts in breach of the 
Defence Procurement Directive, and unjustified offsets requirements.  
 
Furthermore, the scope of a Member States ability to take measures necessary 
to protect their essential security interests set out in Article 346(1)(b) TFEU 
relates to products for civil use, dual use and specifically military purposes. 
The legal situation regarding these categories, at least in theory, is rather 
clear; products for civil use is not covered by the exemption ground in Article 
346(1)(b) TFEU already according to its wording – exemptions should relate 
to “arms, munitions and war material”. Products that are specifically 
designed and developed for military purposes are also within the scope of the 
Article, which can be seen in Finnish Turntables, and qualifies for further 
assessment. Products for dual use can be exempted on the basis of Article 
346(1)(b) TFEU, providing it has been significantly modified for military 
purposes. However, more case law or guidance is needed to clarify what the 
concept “significantly modified” means.  
 
Looking at the level of scrutiny of the Court, a measure should be well 
grounded and proportionate. The Court does not want to provide possible loop 
holes which could undermine the Internal Market, which indicates that 
modifications that have constituted a heavy investment, in time, money, 
resources etc., which cannot easily be changed into a civil product where 
these investments would be of significant relevance, should stand a better 
chance of being accepted under Article 346(1)(b) TFEU.   
 
Regarding the intensity of scrutiny of Article 346(1)(a) TFEU, it is not well 
known. As previously mentioned, it was indirectly brought up by the Court 
in German Military Exports due to Germany arguing that the Commission 
could not prove the alleged infringement. This was true, but only because 
Germany claimed that it did not have to provide the Commission with the 
information. Article 346(1)(a) TFEU was officially addressed in case ZZ (C-
300/11) in 2013, were the Court was asked if the principle of effective judicial 
protection could be set aside on the basis of Article 346(1)(a) and the interests 
of State security, by not informing a Union citizen of the essence of the 
grounds against him. The Court stated shortly once more, that the mere fact 
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that a decision concerns State security does not result in European Union law 
being inapplicable, thus repeating existing case law established in Italy v. 
Commission (C-387/05).  
 
This provides for an interesting link to Advocate General Kokott’s statement 
in her Opinion in Commission v. Austria, that these are days where threat of 
international terrorism is a focus of public interest everywhere. The Court 
now has the opportunity to further clarify the scope of Article 346(1)(a) 
TFEU. What can be said in the light of ZZ is that again, just as when dealing 
with letter (b) of the same provision, the use of Article 346(1)(a) TFEU needs 
to be well grounded and proportionate. Setting aside the basic fundaments 
which ensures the right to a fair trial cannot be done by simply invoking State 
security. This was put forward by the Court in the present case by referring 
to Italy v. Commission (one of the Military Export cases) para. 45, which 
repeats case law established in cases Kreil and Sirdar. Although not repeated 
in ZZ, in these cases as well as in Johnston, the Court held that when 
determining the scope of any derogation from a fundamental right, the 
principle of proportionality must also be observed. 
 
Concerning the scope of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU in relation to the possibility 
to use offset requirements, it differs depending on which category of offsets 
that are at hand. Civil offsets seem unlikely to be accepted by the Court under 
Article 346 TFEU, due to letter (b) in combination with case law prescribing 
that only material which “by virtue of its intrinsic characteristics may be 
regarded as having been specifically designed and developed, also as a result 
of substantial modifications, for military purposes”. Military offset 
requirements on the other hand, are in a slightly better position. In order to be 
justified, they will have to be necessary to protect the essential security 
interests of the Member State in question. This is a high threshold. According 
to case law, the exemption of Article 346 TFEU is to be interpreted narrowly, 
and since the Commission’s position regarding offsets is that they stand in 
direct contrast with Treaty law, the threshold should be even higher. The 
contracting entity/authority in the Member State concerned will have to show 
that the offset requirements are proportionate. 
 
Furthermore, indirect military offset requirements appears to be difficult to 
justify under Article 346(1)(b) TFEU. In addition, indirect offsets that benefit 
non-military equipment or the civil sector distorts the EU Internal Market for 
civilian goods. However, there are plausible situations where it could be 
argued to fulfill the grounds of justification. For example, smaller countries 
might find themselves in a situation where they need to acquire certain 
knowledge related to production, or development of products intended for 
specifically military purposes due to their essential security interests. 
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Moreover, indirect military offsets relating to maintaining existing shipyards 
on domestic soil or building new ones might be justified in a situation where 
an island country wants to ensure the continued openness of its sea lanes. 
Provided, for example, that the relationship with a close neighboring country 
is tense, even bad at times, this could be a genuinely necessary measure to 
protect their essential security interests. Still, regardless, these measures must 
comply with the principle of proportionality.    
 
Moreover, direct military offset requirements seem less difficult to justify 
under Article 346(1)(b) TFEU, due to them naturally being intended for 
specifically military purposes. Moreover, the Commission address this 
slightly lower threshold in the Guidance Note Security of Supply, where it 
provides several scenarios in which the requirement of direct military offsets 
can be lawful.   
 
In addition, discrimination on the basis of nationality is a fundamental 
characteristic of offsets as applied today. However, if a Member State were 
to require “EU offsets” from a third country prime contractor, it does not 
appear to be in violation of EU law. If the offsets are allowed to be carried 
out within the EU and not specifically in one Member State, it does not appear 
to be discriminatory, and therefore lawful as long as it complies with other 
fundamental rules and principles of EU law. This construction would not be 
in breach of World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules either, since trade in 
defence equipment is not covered by the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement.145 On the other hand, this would probably be a demanding 
process to organise and without knowing that there will be an economic 
benefit, this practice is not likely to be used often if at all.  
 
Concerning government-to-government contracts, it seems to be the position 
of the Commission that Article 13(f) of the Defence Procurement Directive is 
primarily intended for used equipment and surplus stock. Trybus also argues 
that a contract exempting new equipment should not fall under the 
government-to-government exemption due to the main rule that exemptions 
should be interpreted strictly. On the other side however, there is no support 
for an exclusion of new equipment in the wording of the Directive. 
Consequently, it can be argued that the focus of the Commission should be 
on compliance of the initial equipment purchase from the private market with 
the Defence Procurement Directive. Furthermore, the Commission 
acknowledges in paragraph 26 of the Guidance Note on Defence- and 
Security-specific Exclusions that Article 13(f) of the Defence Procurement 
                                                 
145 Council Decision 2014/115/EU of 2 December 2013 on the conclusion of the Protocol 
Amending the Agreement on Government Procurement OJ [2014] L68/1, Protocol, Annex, 
Appendix I, Annex 4; Directive 2009/81/EC, Recital 18.  
 54 
Directive “applies to all contracts for the supply of military or sensitive 
equipment, including, in principle, even purchases of new material”. This 
makes sense; the Defence Procurement Directive is still applicable when the 
selling government procures from the private sector, ensuring that the goods 
are procured in accordance with the Directive.  
 
In addition, considering the safeguard clause in Article 11 of the Defence 
Procurement Directive, following the actual wording of the Directive 
arguably would not constitute a circumvention of the Directive. The purpose 
of the Defence Procurement Directive is to establish a European Defence 
Equipment Market (EDEM) by presenting contracts in the defence sector to 
competition. This is set out in Recital 2 and 4 of the Defence Procurement 
Directive. Allowing government-to-government transactions on the 
“secondary equipment market” will not obstruct this.  
 
Moreover, the Commission has repeatedly indicated that the purchase of 
equipment from a third country outside of the EU may circumvent the 
Directive. In the same Guidance Note, the Commission still warns Member 
States that they could be circumventing the Directive, if they purchase new 
material which could also have been delivered through an open competition 
within the EU, by using direct contract awards to third countries. This 
tendency by the Commission to promote the EU Internal Market appears 
again in Barnier’s letters to Romania and Bulgaria. This indeed resonates well 
with a pro-European perspective: when Member States opt for government-
to-government purchases on a larger scale, it undeniably undermines the 
competitiveness of the European defence industries while placing the 
Member State’s money in a non-European market. Buying defence equipment 
in Europe contributes to improve the economy of the European defence 
sector, and thus creating more jobs and ideally lowering the prices as a 
consequence of competitive behaviour. Furthermore, with nothing stopping a 
Member State from procuring directly from a third country, the incentive to 
do so would be high since the flexibility is greater outside the scope of the 
Defence Procurement Directive. 
 
To conclude the analysis of the government-to-government exemption in 
relation to Article 346 TFEU, such contracts can now be entered into without 
a tender procedure, which previously would have required the use of Article 
346 TFEU.  
 
In conclusion, the different grounds for derogation in the Defence 
Procurement Directive seem to provide for different kinds of thresholds. My 
interpretation is that Security of Information must be the easiest exemption to 
use, since it is closely related to an actual provision in Article 346 TFEU – 
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that of letter (a). This provision will be dealt with more closely when 
analysing Commission v. Austria below. However, Advocate General Kokott 
expresses this close relationship in paragraph 43 of her opinion, where she 
states that Article 346(1)(a) TFEU is fleshed out in Article 13 (a) of the 
Defence Procurement Directive. This provision is almost identical in its 
wording to Article 346(1)(a) TFEU. Government-to-government exemptions 
are not difficult to use either – but Member States selling to other Member 
States still need to procure the equipment in question in accordance with the 
Defence Procurement Directive. The different threshold concerning offsets 
has already been analysed, and the importance of security of supply will be 
highlighted below.  
 
4.2 Potential outcomes and observations 
of Commission v. Austria  
Interestingly, Advocate General Kokott did not make any reference to Article 
346 TFEU as an exemption to be used on a case-by-case basis, which as 
previously stated has been established by the Court in German Export (C-
372/05, para. 76). Trybus compared this way of reasoning with the national 
code in Italy v. Commission (C-157/06), and argued that a national code 
cannot be an exemption on a case-by-case basis; it becomes an automatic 
exemption and can therefore be illegal. This makes sense; Article 346 TFEU 
is to be interpreted strictly and in exceptional and clearly defined cases. In 
Commission v. Austria, Austrian law requires that the production of all 
documents entailing secrecy or compliance with secrecy rules to be awarded 
exclusively to the Österreichische Staatsdruckerei GmbH.  
 
Since the Court has clearly stated that Article 346 TFEU shall be used on a 
case-by-case basis, it would be natural to notice this in the Opinion while also 
reaching the conclusion that Austria has failed to comply with its obligations 
under Treaty rules. Advocate General Kokott states that the resolution of the 
case depends on if the essential security interests and measures that Austria 
has presented can justify completely dispensing with the practice for the 
award of public contracts prescribed by EU law. Already here, before 
performing a proportionality test, it could be concluded that the Austrian law 
violates settled case law on Article 346 TFEU. It can also be noted, that the 
position of the Commission is that every exemption from Article 346 TFEU 
shall be done on a case-by-case basis “with great care”, further narrowing the 
scope, in its Communication on how to apply Article 346 TFEU.  
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Regarding public procurement, it seems to be clear that the possibility to 
exclude compliance with EU law should be removed in cases where the 
Member State can resort to less restrictive measures. These could be carrying 
out a tender with high requirements in the selection criteria and extensive 
confidentiality obligations. An example of high requirements in the selection 
criteria is an obligation to execute the contract in the territory of the 
contracting authority, as stated in Commission v. Germany (C-205/84). 
 
This far, Article 346(1)(b) TFEU has been given significantly more space in 
case law. However, since 2011 there has been four cases regarding Article 
346 TFEU at the Court of Justice, and half of them have concerned Article 
346(1)(a) TFEU. This is not surprising, and corresponds well with the current 
climate of taking measures to protect information, which is also illustrated by 
the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) entering into 
force in May of 2018. The purpose of the Regulation is to strengthen the 
protection of personal data, and illustrates that the Council and the European 
Parliament have realised the importance of protecting information. Moreover, 
Advocate General Kokott emphasized in her Opinion, that these are times 
when international terrorism is a focus of public interest everywhere, and this 
especially regards security of sensitive information.   
 
Regardless of the outcome in Commission v. Austria, the approach of the 
Court to Article 346 TFEU as a whole and especially letter (a) will be 
interesting to observe. It is an excellent opportunity to further develop the 
scope of application of both, however it is not unlikely that the Court simply 
states that Austria interpreted the exemptions from EU public procurement 
too widely, and concludes that the direct award of the contract fails a strict 
proportionality test regardless. Moreover, last time the Court dealt with 
Article 346(1)(a) TFEU was in ZZ (C-300/11). It approached the Article in 
two paragraphs and stated shortly that the fact that a decision concerns State 
security does not make European Union law inapplicable, thus repeating 
existing case law and consequently not giving any further guidance on the 
matter. 
 
To conclude, the importance of Article 346(1)(a) TFEU will likely increase, 
and more cases can be expected to reach the Court of Justice. The future 
development of Article 346(1)(a) TFEU is likely to be of importance also for 
the interpretation of Article 346(1)(b) TFEU. Examples of the two letters 
affecting each other can be seen in Case C-372/05 German Military Exports. 
In this case, Germany relied on Article 346(1)(b) TFEU when trying to justify 
duty-free imports of military equipment. The Court did not accept the 
arguments, but interestingly decided to rule on Article 346 TFEU as a whole, 
instead of only on letter (b). Consequently, a case concerning letter (b) 
 57 
affected the future interpretation of letter (a). This relationship is also noticed 
by Kokott in para. 45 of the Opinion in Commission v. Austria. Furthermore, 
the relatively few judgements related to Article 346 TFEU overall increase 
the likelihood of Article 346(1)(a) and (b) TFEU affecting each other.  
 
4.3 Will the European defence market turn 
into a competitive market? 
The third question on which this thesis is based on is: will the defence market 
turn into a competitive market. Considering the answers to the previous 
questions and the thesis in general, it will be analysed below if we can expect 
to see a more competitive, and thus integrated, defence market.  
The previously often used exemption in Article 346 TFEU brought most 
armament and related services outside of the EU’s trade, competition and 
procurement rules. This led to 28 different and segregated defence markets, 
resulting in reduced levels of innovation and competitiveness, higher prices, 
duplication and reduced transparency. Moreover, protectionism and 
inefficiency characterised the defence markets, and the industry is still rated 
as one of the three most corrupt business sectors in the world. An integrated 
European defence market is important for competition; it increases the supply 
of goods and services on the Internal Market. Operating in a market economy, 
a system based on supply and demand is supposed to promote the purchase 
of the best solution, instead of an inferior one which might be purchased on a 
fragmented marked instead simply because it comes from the national market. 
The prior would result in a more efficient defence market in terms of quality, 
but also from an economic and time-efficient perspective. 
In order to achieve this, the Commission must become more active. As has 
been showed, there are plenty of guidance to access today; there are 
communications and guidance notes regarding the application of Article 346 
TFEU and several other exemption specific ones. Consequently, lack of 
guidance does not seem to be the problem. This is further illustrated in 
Spanish Weapons, where the Spanish government relied on Article 346 TFEU 
in order to boost its growing defence export sector. In order to put pressure 
on Member States to comply with the Defence Procurement Directive and 
Article 346 TFEU, the Commission just opened infringement procedures 
against five Member States for not complying with the Directive. 
 
Furthermore, the defence companies must start to challenge procurement 
decisions from Member States to correct the market. As stated in the 
Commissions implementation report on the Defence Procurement Directive, 
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high value deals are still regularly procured outside of the Directive. Many 
small factors is likely to make the difference, over time. The defence industry 
is politically sensitive as well, due to the high number of direct and indirect 
employees. The Member States are obstructing the effectiveness of the 
Directive; no one wants to be responsible for the loss of hundreds or 
thousands of jobs in one Member State as a result of another Member State 
being better competitors. Even though the idea is that the majority benefits 
from an integrated market, short term effects can be bitter for companies that 
do not keep up with competition and their employees.  
Moreover, the ambition to integrate the European defence market put 
Member States and the principle of solidarity to the test. It is of course a risk 
to treat the Union as one entity in defence matters if there are doubts 
concerning its will to actually act and remain together in the future and during 
times of crisis. The Member States need to be able to trust each other. In 
matters of security of supply for example, there is a need to be able to count 
on the Member State producing spare parts on behalf of another Member 
State, to not deliberately refuse to deliver. In addition, it needs to be ensured 
that the supply chain is not cut off during a potential invasion. This can of 
course not be guaranteed, but some locations suit the purpose of a potential 
procurement better than others in this regard. To conclude this point, if the 
Member States build their defence industries or supply chains depending on 
each other, they need to be able to do so. Otherwise, the chain will collapse. 
However, an already integrated industry do work as an incitement for 
continuous cooperation.  
Consequently, whether or not the defence sector will turn into a competitive 
market depends on many small measures such as the EDF initiative from the 
Commission. These small things, and the ability of the Commission to ensure 
that they are properly implemented, largely depends on the Member States 
support. The Member States are the procuring party in defence procurements, 
and it is therefore up to them to give the Directive the effect that the 
Commission wanted it to have. It is a power play, were collaboration and 
unity makes a big difference.   
 
The guidance notes are not legally binding and the Court is able to rule against 
them if statements in the guidance notes are challenged before court. Because 
of the limited amount of case law, the current legal state is not as clear as one 
might normally think in this situation. Usually, when legal acts are not 
challenged, it means that the market is satisfied with the current situation. 
However, the defence market is often argued to be special, due to the very 
limited amount of buyers and their nature: the costumers in defence 
procurements are states. Therefore, the relationship between buyer and seller 
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is even more important than normal, and defence companies do not want to 
challenge it by taking one of few potential buyers to court. Consequently, the 
fact that there are few cases settled in court does not mean that the market 
functions well. On the contrary, it can be argued that it implies the opposite 
in this sector.  
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